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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the premise that certain types 
of negative information are associated with auditor 
switches. A data set of 305 auditor switches from 1976 to 
1994, extracted from the Compustat data base (limited 
subscription), was analyzed using tests of proportions and 
nonparametric sign tests. The data set consists of 
negative information extracted from the switching 
companies' income statements (i.e., net losses or 
extraordinary items) or calculated from the items extracted 
(i.e., net income adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items).
The initial results, based on tests which assumed 
random movement of net income, did not support the notion 
that net losses or decreases in net income (with or without 
adjustment to reverse the effect of extraordinary items) 
occurred disproportionately in the year after the auditor 
switch compared to the year before the auditor switch. 
However, supplemental analyses which used a different 
expectation for net income (i.e., a 1972 finding by Ball 
and Watts that accounting net income each year is greater
iii
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than or equal to the preceding year's net income) do 
support the notion that more negative information is 
reported in income statements following an auditor switch 
than preceding the auditor switch.
This study uses a data source, the Compustat data 
base, which has not been used much in previously published 
journal articles on auditor switching. (In fact, when the 
study was begun [in 1996], the author found no previously 
published study of auditor switching which had used this 
source.) Investigation of the underlying data indicates 
that (1) switches among non-Big audit firms are not 
available before 1989, (2) auditor code changes before 1990
which appear to indicate a change from non-Big audit firms
to Big audit firms might actually be the result of a
business combination of audit firms, and therefore should 
be subjected to further investigation, and (3) auditor
codes should be visually examined over multiple years (for
reasonableness) before using the codes as a basis for 
auditor switching studies. Additionally, the data set 
employed indicates that auditor switches by publicly-owned 
companies may frequently be a predictor of bad financial 
news which has not yet occurred.
Key words: auditor switching, negative information, 
submartingale, nonparametric tests
iv
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 In t roduc ti on
Most top-level managers of sizable publicly-owned 
companies possess private information.1 Arguably, when 
such private information is negative (negative 
information) , managers have an incentive to delay 
disclosing such information. However, the attempts of 
managers to delay the disclosure of such information may be 
futile once the negative information becomes known to the 
external auditors. In an effort to delay the external 
auditors from finding and, in turn, requiring the 
disclosure of negative information, managers may choose to 
discontinue their company's relationship with their 
incumbent audit firm. In this regard, this study 
investigates the association between auditor switching and 
certain types of negative information.
1For example, managers know about non-public negotiations 
in process with prospective major new customers (or 
vendors, etc.), the related potential positive (or 
negative) effect on their employing company's profitability 
and, in turn, the ultimate related positive (negative) 
effect on the value of the managers' bonuses, stock owned 
and stock options.
1
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21.2 Auditor Switching--An Overview
Based on the results of a literature review,
Krishnan (1994, 210-211) gave the following reasons for 
auditor switching: dissatisfaction with service,
dissatisfaction over fees, disagreements over accounting 
issues (opinion shopping), management change, change of 
engagement partner, (auditor) resignation, initial public 
offerings, rapid growth, and search for "credible 
auditors." While this list is not exhaustive, it provides 
insight into the diversity of possible reasons for auditor 
switching. The focus of this study is on a reason not 
specifically mentioned by Krishnan: management's desire to
delay disclosing negative information.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
This study is grounded in the notion that managers 
switch auditors to delay disclosing negative information. 
The scenario underlying this notion follows. First, 
managers possess certain negative information and wish to 
delay disclosing such information. Second, managers 
believe that the present auditors are likely to discover 
the negative information if they continue as the company's 
auditors. Third, managers do not believe that they will be 
able to convince the auditors that the negative information
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3is immaterial (i.e., the information is so insignificant 
that disclosure of such information is not considered 
necessary in the circumstances). Consequently, managers 
switch auditors in an effort to delay disclosure of 
negative information.
1.4 Objective of this Study
This study investigates the premise that certain types 
of negative information are associated with auditor 
switches. Specifically, this study seeks to determine if 
the proportion of certain types of negative information in 
financial statements increases in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) relative to the year before the 
auditor switch (t-1).2
There is no a priori reason to expect certain types of 
negative information in the financial statements to occur 
systematically with respect to the timing of auditor 
switching. If such items occur randomly rather than 
systematically, there is no reason to assume that there 
will be any greater number or proportion of them during the 
year after the auditor switch than during the year before 
the auditor switch. Accordingly, if a statistically
2The logic underlying the use of the year after the auditor 
switch (t+1) rather than the year of the auditor switch (t) 
is discussed at length in section 3.4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4significant relationship is found to occur, this suggests 
that certain types of negative information are somehow 
associated with auditor switching. In turn, such an 
association would support the notion that managers switch 
auditors to delay publicizing negative information.
1.5 Methodology
A data set containing 3 05 auditor switches from 1976 
to 1994, extracted from the Compustat data base (limited 
subscription),3 was analyzed using tests of proportions and 
nonparametric sign tests. In general, the data set 
consists of certain items extracted from the switching 
companies' income statements (i.e., net losses or 
extraordinary items) or calculated from the items extracted 
(i.e., net income adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items).
In essence, the data proxy for negative information. 
Again, if the proportion of certain types of negative 
information in financial statements significantly increases 
in the year after the auditor switch relative to the year 
before the auditor switch, this supports the notion that 
managers switch auditors to delay disclosing negative 
information.
3Sample selection is discussed at length in section 3.8.
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1.6 Differences from Earlier Studies
5
Dhaliwal, Schatzberg, and Trombley (1993, 23) posit 
the premise that certain negative information is known to 
the auditor (perhaps even before known to management).
This study allows the possibility that management is aware 
of certain negative information before the auditor, and can 
act on that information before the auditor learns of it.
For convenience, the term management is used here to mean 
managers collectively.
Knapp and Elikai's (1990) information suppression 
hypothesis assumes that management needs to suppress 
information permanently. This study allows for the 
possibility that management can sometimes be satisfied by 
suppressing information temporarily rather than 
permanently. Accordingly, this study is somewhat similar 
to Kluger and Shields (1991, 255), who discussed the 
possibility of auditor changes being associated with 
attempts to "delay4 the release of unfavourable 
information."
This study is completely dissimilar to Teoh (1992, 2, 
citing Fried and Schiff 1981, Chow and Rice 1982, and 
Schwartz and Menon 1985) , who, based on his review of prior
4Emphas i s added.
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6research, concluded that a "switch signifies that the firm 
was attempting to influence the auditor." Auditor 
influence is not at issue in this study given that, in this 
study, the auditor is assumed to be unaware of the negative 
information at the time of the switch (or is assumed to be 
aware of the negative information but, due to "timely" 
dismissal/termination, is not in a position to cause 
disclosure of negative information). Stated otherwise, 
this study is grounded in the notion that management is 
attempting to avoid the auditor, not influence the auditor- 
-perhaps because management knows it would be unable to 
persuade the auditors to not require disclosure of the 
negative information.
Chow and Rice (1982, 333) addressed negative 
information by testing for a relationship between auditor 
switching and type of audit opinion in the year following 
qualification. However, such a test does not measure 
whether management was successful in delaying the 
revelation of negative information. The financial 
statements for the year following an auditor switch could 
show a loss, resulting from the successful delay in 
reporting negative information, and the auditors would not 
qualify the opinion, yet management would have achieved its 
goal of delaying the revelation of negative information.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7Because of the purpose and nature of their test, Chow and 
Rice's test would show no such association even if one 
exists.
Campbell and McNiel (1985, 317) attributed 
concentration of client companies with particular auditors 
over time, after starting from an equal distribution among 
audit firms, as being the result of stochastic (random) 
forces. As Campbell and McNiel (1985, 322) stated, "when 
cumulated over time, pure luck may advance some firms to a 
position of dominance while relegating others to 
obscurity." This study assumes that purposeful actions by 
clients and auditors are more likely than random choices to 
shape the market for audit services and size of audit firms 
over a period of decades.
DeFond (1992, 17) reported that "managers seem to 
change auditors in anticipation of some agency 
conflicts...." The concept that managers/agents do not 
wish to disclose negative information to their investors/ 
principals and will take steps to prevent the 
auditors/monitors from learning of the negative information 
is consistent with an agency-model formulation.
Intuitively, in an agency-model context, managers/agents 
wishing to delay disclosing negative information to their 
investors/principals would seek out low (lower) quality
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8auditors (i.e., not-as-high quality auditors) to replace 
their current high (higher) quality auditors.
Significantly, prior research has not concentrated on 
managements' incentives and motivations to replace high- 
quality auditors with lower quality auditors. Rather, as 
indicated below, prior authors have assumed that managers 
were always moving to higher quality auditors rather than 
lower quality auditors.5
The current paper argues that size alone alters 
auditors' incentives such that, ceteris paribus, 
larger audit firms supply a higher level of audit 
quality (DeAngelo 1981b, 184) .
Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality 
as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six 
auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six 
auditors (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 
1988, 1) .
Clients that switch from non-Big Eight to Big Eight 
auditors are defined as movers in search of 
credibility (Krishnan 1994, 211).
5Prior authors have never discussed the facts that (1) the 
largest audit firms which clients switched from were the 
same firms which other clients switched to, and (2) each of 
the largest firms both lost audit clients to the other 
largest firms and also picked up audit clients from the 
other largest firms. Logically--at least, according to the 
theory of such prior authors that movement is always to a 
higher quality auditor--this means that each of these 
largest audit firms was simultaneously higher quality and 
lower quality than each of the other largest audit firms. 
This simultaneous existence of mutually exclusive states is 
of course an impossibility.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9This study allows for the possibility that managers might 
move from high quality auditors in an attempt to find not- 
as-high quality auditors.6
1.7 Conclusion
This study investigates the notion that managers 
switch auditors to delay disclosing negative information.
An overview of this study was provided in this chapter.
The remainder of this study is presented as follows.
Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature, including 
previous avenues of research and theories concerning why 
companies switch audit firms. Chapter 3 is a discussion of 
the methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 presents the 
results of the study. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the 
findings, the contributions of this study, and the 
implications for further research. There are also several 
appendices. Appendices A, B, C, and D discuss concepts 
which have not been explicitly addressed in the prior 
literature on auditor switching. Appendix E presents a new 
model of the economy. This new model in Appendix E was the 
original motivation for investigating auditor switching, 
though the same study can be motivated by other means as
sThe issue of auditor quality is addressed at length in 
section 2.3.
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1 0
mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 6. Appendix F explains 
that the type of auditor switch (auditor dismissal versus 
auditor resignation) is irrelevant for the purposes of this 
study.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 Literature Review
The structure of the literature review is as follows. 
Section 2.2 provides a summary of reasons (or variables) 
which earlier researchers have hypothesized to be 
associated with auditor switching. In essence, this 
section provides the reader with an overview of the variety 
of research previously undertaken regarding auditor 
switching. Section 2.3 focuses on audit quality. The 
notion that audit quality differs among audit firms (or at 
least the notion that managers perceive that audit quality 
differs among audit firms) is critical to the underlying 
premise of this study. Stated otherwise, managers could 
not reasonably expect to delay the disclosure of negative 
information unless they hoped to find some difference 
(reduction) in audit quality between the predecessor audit 
firm and the successor audit firm. Section 2.4 gives 
additional considerations with respect to auditor 
switching. The chapter concludes at Section 2.5 with a 
brief summary.
11
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1 2
2.2 Auditor Switching: Previously Hypothesized
Reasons (or Variables)
Why do managers switch from one auditor to another?
One possibility is excessive fees (see Table 1, following) . 
However, if excessive fees charged were the true reason for 
the switch, why are other auditees willing to engage that 
same audit firm as their new auditor in the face of 
knowledge that their new auditor has been overcharging its 
clients? Why, in an efficient marketplace, do other 
existing clients of the overcharging audit firm retain the 
overcharging auditor when they might reasonably conclude 
that they are also being overcharged?
Given that at any time, a manager can obtain a lower 
audit fee by switching (Garsombke and Armitage 1993, 93 and 
96) , why do managers switch infrequently?7 Given that a 
manager can obtain a permanently lower fee by switching 
from a Big Eight/Six/Five8 firm to a national, but non-Big
7DeAngelo (1981b, 188) stated "...the uniform finding of 
extant studies... is that the rate at which client firms 
change auditors is low."
8Through business combinations, the Big Eight have become 
the Big Six and then the Big Five. Because the number of 
firms in the largest tier has been shrinking from eight to 
six to five, this study simply refers to the Big firms, 
with Big capitalized, to distinguish those firms--of 
whatever number, depending on time frame--from the others. 
For convenience, the terms Big Eight, Big Six, and Big Five 
are not converted to the term Big firm when found in quoted 
material.
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Table 1
Auditor switching related to fees charged
Author(s) Information about switch Additional comments, if any
Garsombke and Armitage 
1993, 93 and 96
Clients can obtain a lower 
audit fee by switching audit 
firms.
DeAngelo 1981b, 188, citing 
seven studies, noted that 
"...the uniform finding of 
extant studies...is that 
the rate at which client 
firms change auditors is 
low."
Johnson and Lys 1990, 285, 
Table 1
Clients switching from a Big 
firm generally switch to 
another Big firm.
Addams and Davis 1994, 40 
and 41
Fees are not the dominant 
issue in auditor switching 
by the Inc. 500 firms 
surveyed.
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Table 1 continued
Krishnan 1994, 211 At least some "switchers may 
not reveal their true 
reasons for switching."
Knapp 1988, 45:
"...users...may infer that 
even when disagreements 
(between auditor and 
client) are not reported, 
an auditor change is likely 
a consequence of auditor- 
client conflict."
Eichenseher, Hagigi, and 
Shields 1989, 39; Williams 
1988, 248
Outside shareholders are 
suspicious concerning 
management motives in 
auditor selection.
14
1 5
firm,9 why (as suggested by Johnson and Lys, 1990, 285, 
Table 1) do managers switching from a Big firm generally 
switch to another Big firm and pay the higher fees of a Big 
firm instead of the lower fees of a somewhat smaller firm?
In each of the above cases, managers forego 
opportunities to obtain audits for lower fees. This 
suggests that fees are not necessarily the determining 
factor in selection of an auditor. If excessive fees are 
not the primary motivation for switching, what other 
explanations exist for switching?
Table 2, following, provides a summary of reasons (or 
variables) which earlier researchers have hypothesized to 
be associated with auditor switching. No particular reason 
dominates the results. Therefore, each reason might 
account for some auditor switches without accounting for 
most auditor switches. Such a situation, where many causal 
factors exist, makes it difficult for researchers to 
establish the causation by use of statistical techniques, 
because so many other causal factors are simultaneously 
producing the same result.
Admittedly, some switches are easily explained without 
resort to nefarious motives (e.g., corporate takeovers or
9Ettredge and Greenberg (1990, 208) stated "...prior 
studies...found a fee premium for the Big Eight when 
compared to all other auditors."
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some other management change in which the new managers wish 
to deal with the audit firm they previously dealt with) . 
However, according to Schwartz and Menon (1985, 249), "a 
general theory that explains why firms change auditors is 
yet to emerge." As evidenced by the various studies cited 
in this chapter, research regarding auditor switching has 
continued to date.
This study continues in the tradition of examining 
potential reasons why managers change from one audit firm 
to another. Specifically, this study contributes to the 
literature by investigating a possibility not previously 
examined: an association between auditor switching and
certain types of negative information.
2.3 Auditor Switching: Audit Quality
The notion that audit quality differs among audit 
firms (or at least the notion that managers perceive that 
audit quality differs among audit firms) is critical to the 
underlying premise of this study. Stated otherwise, 
managers could not reasonably expect to delay the 
disclosure of negative information unless they hoped to 
find some difference (reduction) in audit quality between 
the predecessor audit firm and the successor audit firm. 
However, researchers differ as to whether audit quality is 
at issue when managers switch auditors.
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Table 2
Auditor switching: previously hypothesized reasons (or variables)
Author(s) Reason(s) for, or
variable(s) associated with,
switching
Additional comments, if any
Burton and Roberts (1967), 
as cited by Chow and Rice 
(1982, 327-328)
accounting standards 
disputes
changes in management
demand for additional 
services
needs arising out of new 
financing
Chow and Rice said 
accounting standards 
disputes accounted for only 
six switches out of eighty- 
three examined by Burton 
and Roberts.
Chow and Rice said "these10 
findings are supported by 
Carpenter and Strawser 
(1971) and a study by an ad 
hoc committee of the AICPA 
(1971)."
10The findings referred to are those of Burton and Roberts (1967).
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Table 2 continued
Fried and Schiff (1981, 
327)
changes in auditor fee 
structure
client's need for additional 
services
regular auditor rotation 
policy
Chow and Rice (1982, 328) They reported a significant 
association between receipt 
of a qualified opinion and 
switching auditors. Of the 
variables they used in a 
conditional logit analysis, 
"qualification is the only 
significant variable in 
explaining switching."
(330)
A different analysis of the 
data shows that companies 
in certain industries are 
more likely to receive 
qualified opinions, and 
certain audit firms are 
more likely to issue 
qualified opinions. See 
their page 332.
Williams (1988, 247) a management change in which 
new management wishes to 
deal with the firm it 
previously dealt with
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Table 2 continued
Williams (1988, 250) fast growth causing a need
for a larger audit firm, and
industry or other
specialization available in
the lead office or elsewhere
in the firm
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Table 2 continued
Francis and Wilson (1988, 
668)
Francis and Wilson noted 
that "at best, only a very 
weak association has been 
demonstrated to exist 
between agency cost proxies 
and audit firm choice with 
little interstudy 
consistency."
managerial ownership
bonus plans
diffusion of ownership
Francis and Wilson said 
Eichenseher and Shields 
(1986) found this 
significant, and Simunic 
and Stein (1987) found this 
significant for initial 
public offerings.
Francis and Wilson said 
Palmrose (1984) tested 
these, but found them not 
significant.
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Table 2 continued
Francis and Wilson (1988, 
668): continued
leverage Francis and Wilson said 
Eichenseher and Shields 
(1986) found a positive 
association, Simunic and 
Stein (1987) found a 
negative association, and 
insignificant results were 
reported by Palmrose 
(1984), Healy and Lys 
(1986), and Johnson and Lys 
(1986).
2 1
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Francis and Wilson (1988, 
668): continued
Table 2 continued
However, Francis and Wilson 
appear to misinterpret 
Healy and Lys (1986), since 
Healy and Lys1s reported 
test (1986, 258, 259, and 
262) was a test of growth 
in debt, not a test of 
leverage nor any debt-to- 
equity or debt-to-total- 
assets ratio. Healy and 
Lys also tested growth in 
equity. If both debt and 
equity grow, but at the 
same percentage rate, then 
there is no change in 
leverage even though the 
company is growing.
2 2
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Table 2 continued
Francis and Wilson (1988, 
668): continued
new securities issues Francis and Wilson (1988, 
668) stated that "new 
debt/stock, post auditor 
change was tested by Healy 
and Lys (1986) and was not 
significant. Johnson and 
Lys (1986) reported a 
positive and significant 
association with the choice 
of a larger auditor."
Knapp (1988, 42) corporate managers' desire 
to manipulate their firm's 
reported financial condition
This is a reasonable 
interpretation of 
Bedingfield and Loeb (1974, 
67), who examined the 8-K 
forms (reporting auditor 
changes) filed with the SEC 
between November 1971 and 
February 1973.
Knapp cited Bedingfield and 
Loeb (1974), Klott (1984), 
and Laventhol & Horwath 
(1985).
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Table 2 continued
Haskins and Williams (1990, 
56), citing various authors
opinion shopping (Chow and 
Rice 1982)
"information suppression" 
(Kluger and Shields, 1987)
agency-theory-based Big 
Eight vs. non-Big Eight 
"product differentiation 
approach" (Simunic and 
Stein, 1987; Francis and 
Wilson, 1988)
Teoh (1992, 7) Teoh's model posits the 
existence of a region 
related to a cost/benefit 
analysis where "no firm will 
switch auditors because the 
likelihood of a clean 
opinion from a new auditor 
is too low."
Elitzur and Falk (1996, 43) 
said: "The position of an 
auditor with respect to 
many reporting issues can 
be inferred from publicly 
available financial reports 
audited by a bidder, 
submissions to standards 
setting bodies, testimonies 
at hearings and in courts, 
and so forth. Auditors 
whose known opinions do not 
match those of the client 
are unlikely to be hired."
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Table 2 continued
Ande rs on, Stokes, and 
Zimmer (1993)
Corporate takeovers
Garsombke and Armitage 
(1993, 95)
timeliness of service 
lack of responsiveness 
cost
Garsombke and Armitage 
surveyed "chief financial 
officers of the 272 firms 
identified on the January 
1988 Disclosure II database 
as having changed auditors 
from 1986 to 1987."
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Table 2 continued
Addams and Davis (1994, 40) accounting firm "not 
sufficiently proactive in 
delivering services to 
company" and "lack of 
responsiveness of CPA firm's 
service"
It is difficult to know how 
much credibility to assign 
to these reasons. Addams 
and Davis (1994, 38) 
surveyed CEO's of the 1992 
Inc. 500 privately held 
companies. The respondents 
ranked twelve factors as 
reasons for selecting an 
audit firm initially, but 
ten different factors as 
reasons for changing to a 
different audit firm. 
Although not expressly 
stated in the article, it 
appears that Addams and 
Davis supplied lists for 
respondents to choose from, 
and the two lists did not 
contain any of the same 
factors.
2 6
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Addams and Davis (1994, 
40): continued
Table 2 continued
Thus, personal 
relationships, technical 
expertise, and industry- 
expert ise were three of the 
four highest-rated reasons 
for selecting an audit firm 
in the first place, and 
ranked higher than any of 
the ten factors mentioned 
for changing audit firms, 
but they were not available 
to be chosen as factors for 
changing audit firms.
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Table 2 continued
Krishnan (1994, 210-211) dissatisfaction with service
dissatisfaction over fees
disagreements over 
accounting issues, 
management change, change of 
engagement partner, 
resignation, initial public 
offerings, rapid growth, and 
search for "credible" 
auditors
Carpenter and Strawser 
1971, 57 surveyed firms 
which went public during 
the fourth quarter of 1969 
and the first quarter of 
1970. This was one of the 
survey responses.
This was another survey 
response in Carpenter and 
Strawser's 1971 study.
Krishnan cited Dopuch and 
Simunic's 1982 conference 
paper, Johnson and Lys
1990, Menon and Williams
1991, and Simunic and Stein 
1987.
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Table 2 continued
Krishnan (1994, 210-211): 
continued
While Krishnan had a number 
of significant variables 
(204-205), he stated that 
the dependent variable 
"represent the auditor's 
opinion in the year before 
the switch (203)," Thus, 
his article reported no 
test associating these 
variables with auditor 
switching; rather, his test 
associated these variables 
with the auditor's opinion, 
not with auditor switching.
Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw 
(1997, 439)
companies' response to audit 
firms' solicitations
Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw 
extracted information from 
the Compustat Annual 
Industrial Tape for the 
years 1980 through 1988, 
and compared audit clients 
in states which banned 
solicitation of clients to 
clients in states which 
allowed solicitation.
2 9
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For example, some researchers (see Table 3, following) 
have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that client 
companies are mere price shoppers. This view treats the 
audit as a commodity and audit firms as suppliers of 
commodities, not of differentiated services,11 since 
clients value the audit report and place no value on the 
relationship with the particular audit firm. This view 
implicitly assumes that all audit firms have the same skill 
sets available, which is a necessary condition for them to 
be able to do any audit of any client. If an audit is 
merely a commodity which every audit firm can supply, then 
quality must not be an issue.
This view is troublesome given that if audits are 
undifferentiated commodities and managers (i.e., client 
companies) are mere price shoppers, then there is no reason 
for the managers who are purchasers of audits to purchase 
their audits from Big firms which charge a high price 
instead of from somewhat smaller audit firms which charge a 
lower price. Moreover, those somewhat smaller audit firms 
would themselves then grow larger by virtue of obtaining so 
many of these large audits of large client companies while 
the Big firms would shrink due to losing the large clients.
11An actual or hoped-for difference in audit quality is a 
form of product differentiation as perceived by purchasers 
of audits.
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In contrast to the preceding, Nichols and Smith (1983, 
534) considered audit services to be differentiated, 
stating that
Dopuch and Simunic (1980) examined a wide variety of 
evidence that might tend to support or refute 
allegations of a lack of competition in the auditing 
profession. They ... argued that many of the . . . 
characteristics of the industry could be explained by 
a product-differentiation hypothesis. More 
specifically, they hypothesized that different 
auditing firms provide auditing services which are 
perceived by investors to be different in quality....
It may be wise to consider economic theory for insight
into this problem. Authors who viewed audits as
undifferentiated services (see Table 3, following) made no
attempt to explain why the Big firms were able to charge
more for their services than small firms charge, when
standard economic theory suggests that the ability to
charge more for undifferentiated services would be competed
away in the marketplace, leaving Big firms charging less
than small firms due to the Big firms' economies of scale.
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Table 3
The audit as an undifferentiated service
Author(s) Position of author(s) Related information
Johnson and Lys 1990, 281 They assumed that client 
companies are mere price 
shoppers. They argued that 
"clients purchase audit 
services from the least 
costly supplier.
...when the incumbent1s 
competitive advantage is 
lost, the client will change 
to a less costly supplier."
DeBerg, Kaplan, and Pany 
1991, 25 and 27 reported 
evidence consistent with 
this view, testing a 
matched-pairs sample of 
switchers and non­
switchers, and finding no 
differences in purchases of 
non-audit services before 
the switch, nor of 
purchases of tax, pension, 
and personnel services 
after the switch.
McConnell (1984, 44), 
citing the Cohen Commission 
(AICPA 1978, 111-112)
"...while public accounting 
firms go to great lengths to 
differentiate their 
services, there is little 
effective product 
differentiation from 
management's viewpoint."
This means that audits 
might be differentiated to 
producers of audits, but 
not to consumers of audits.
32
3 3
Moreover,
In 1976, the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting, and Management (Metcalf Committee) ... 
concluded ... that monopolistic practices by the Big 
Eight have led to a two-tier structure in the audit 
industry--one tier consisting of the eight largest 
auditors and the second tier consisting of all other 
auditors.... (Nichols and Smith 1983, 534)
How does someone first attain a monopoly of a service
industry of undifferentiated services when there are few
barriers to entry? Continuation of a monopoly can occur
through brand differentiation and the necessity for a new
entrant to attain a large size--that is, causing the
formerly undifferentiated services to become differentiated
and raising a barrier to entry--but the initial attainment
of the monopoly is unexplained.
As illustrated in Table 4, following, some researchers
explicitly or implicitly considered audits to be a
differentiated service. Thus, where competition exists
among firms, the audit firms may be competing in attempting
to provide their firm's audit rather than the profession's
standard audit. So long as the firm's audit meets or
exceeds the standards of the profession, each firm is free
to plan the audit, perform the procedures, and formulate an
opinion in a manner different from its competitors.
Audit firms actually differ, whether in audit 
structure, centralization versus decentralization of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4
decision making, staffing mix strategies on engagements 
(e.g., level of expertise of staff members), standard
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 4
The audit as a differentiated service
Author(s) Authors1 position Comments, if any
Danos and Eichenseher 
(1982, 604)
They reported finding 
economies of scale for CPA 
firms.
This means CPA firms can 
differentiate themselves if 
they choose to, in terms of 
the inputs employed to 
perform an audit.
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Table 4 continued
Nichols and Smith (1983, 
534)
They considered audit 
services to be
differentiated. "Dopuch and 
Simunic (1980) examined a 
wide variety of evidence 
that might tend to support 
or refute allegations of a 
lack of competition in the 
auditing profession. They 
... argued that many of the 
characteristics of the 
industry could be explained 
by a product-differentiation 
hypothesis. More 
specifically, they 
hypothesized that different 
auditing firms provide 
auditing services which are 
perceived by investors to be 
different in quality...."
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Table 4 continued
Healy and Lys (1986, 252) "Big Eight firms are able to 
take advantage of economies 
of scale to provide 
specialized services at a 
lower cost than would be 
available from smaller audit 
firms."
Teoh (1992, 8) Teoh's model contains an 
underlying assumption: "The 
incentive to switch auditors 
comes from the positive 
revaluation of the fjfffl fey 
investors because a new 
audit partially reveals an 
initial adverse audit 
assessment error, and a 
consequent partial 
revelation of the firm's 
favorable information...."
This assumption implies 
differences in quality 
across auditors. It might 
also imply that new
auditors are simply more
careful than continuing 
auditors.
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Table 4 continued
Craswell, Francis, and 
Taylor (1995, 297)
They reported support for 
product differentiation even 
within the Big Eight. 
Industry specialist Big 
Eight auditors received a 
34% premium over 
nonspecialist Big Eight 
auditors, and Big Eight 
auditors received a 30% 
premium over non-Big Eight 
auditors. They stated (298) 
there are two separate 
components of the premium 
received by Big Eight 
auditors, a general brand 
name premium just for having 
a recognizable brand name, 
and an industry-specific 
premium for industry 
specialization.
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Table 4 continued
Deis and Giroux (1996, 55) In "audits of Texas 
independent school 
districts, ...first year 
independent audits had 
statistically significant 
lower audit fees. Despite 
the lower fees, quality was 
higher and more audit hours 
were utilized."
This means that audits are 
of different quality.
Elitzur and Falk (1996, 41 
and 42)
Regarding auctions for audit 
services, "...a bidder may 
underestimate the client's 
audit cost and subsequently 
reduce audit quality."
This means that some audits 
are different quality from 
others, even from the same 
office of the same firm.
3 9
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billing rates, markups or markdowns from standard billing 
rates, or other matters. Accordingly, producers of audits 
can easily see that, to themselves, audits are 
differentiated. However, that does not establish whether 
consumers of audits consider audits to be differentiated, 
nor whether such consumers even care whether audits are 
differentiated. Nevertheless, other evidence, such as 
clients' willingness to pay premium fees (Simunic 1980, 
180-181), does tend to establish that clients consider 
audits to be differentiated.
2.4 Additional Considerations
Appendix A contains discussion of the audit and 
associated audit report with respect to an economic bad. 
Prior research has considered the audit to be an economic 
good only. Prior researchers have not addressed an 
alternative hypothesis which is discussed in Appendix A. 
Appendix B contains considerations related to auditor size 
and audit quality. Appendix C discusses the market for 
audits and the information contained in the reactions of 
capital markets to auditor switches. Appendix D contains 
discussion of asymmetry of information. Prior researchers 
have not addressed an alternative hypothesis which is 
discussed in Appendix D. Appendix E contains a model which
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was the original motivation for this study of auditor 
switching.
2.5 Conclusion
Research regarding auditor switching has been 
extensive. This study contributes to the literature by 
investigating a possibility not previously examined: an
association between auditor switching and certain types of 
negative information. The notion that audit quality 
differs among audit firms (or at least the notion that 
managers perceive that audit quality differs among audit 
firms) is critical to the underlying premise of this study. 
Stated otherwise, managers could not reasonably expect to 
delay the disclosure of negative information unless they 
hoped to find some difference (reduction) in audit quality 
between the predecessor audit firm and the successor audit 
firm. Appendix F explains that the type of auditor switch 
(auditor dismissal versus auditor resignation) is 
irrelevant for the purposes of this study.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 Methodology
The structure of the chapter on methodology is as 
follows. Section 3 .2 sets forth the theory underlying this 
study. Section 3.3 operationalizes the theory. Section 
3.4 explains why the year after the auditor switch was used 
instead of the year of the auditor switch. Section 3.5 
presents a nontraditional motivation of the research 
hypotheses. Section 3 .6 presents a traditional motivation 
of the research hypotheses, and states the research 
hypotheses. Section 3.7 sets forth the method used to test 
the hypotheses. Section 3.8 explains the sample selection 
process. Section 3.9 discusses the limitations inherent in 
the study. Section 3.10 presents a summary of this 
chapter.
3.2 Theory Underlying this Study
This study is grounded in the notion that managers 
switch auditors to delay disclosing negative information. 
The scenario underlying this notion follows. First, 
managers possess certain negative information and wish to
42
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delay disclosing such information. Second, managers 
believe that the present auditors are likely to discover 
the negative information if they continue as the company's 
auditors. Third, managers do riot believe that they will be 
able to convince the auditors that the negative information 
is immaterial (i.e., the information is so insignificant 
that disclosure of such information is not considered 
necessary in the circumstances). Consequently, managers 
switch auditors in an effort to delay disclosure of 
negative information. Thus, this theory is effectively a 
joint supposition that (1) management changed auditors with 
the intent of delaying reporting net losses until the year 
following the auditor switch, and (2) they were successful 
in obtaining such delay.
3.3 Operationalization of the Theory
This study investigates the premise that certain types 
of negative information are associated with auditor 
switches. Specifically, this study investigates whether 
the proportion of certain types of negative information in 
financial statements increases in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) relative to the year before the 
auditor switch (t-1) .12
12The logic underlying the use of the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) rather than the year of the auditor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There is no a priori reason to expect certain types of 
negative information to occur in the financial statements 
systematically with respect to the timing of auditor 
switching. If such items occur randomly rather than 
systematically, there is no reason to assume that there 
will be any greater number or proportion of them during the 
year after the auditor switch (t+1) than during the year 
before the auditor switch (t-1). Accordingly, if a 
statistically significant relationship is found to occur, 
this suggests that certain types of negative information 
are somehow associated with auditor switching. In turn, 
such an association would support the notion that managers 
switch auditors to delay publicizing negative information.
3.4 Use of the Year After the Audi tor Swi tch
Data from the year after the auditor switch (t+1) were 
analyzed in lieu of data from the year of the auditor 
switch (t) for the following reasons. First, all auditors 
want to retain clients to obtain quasi-rents (DeAngelo 
1981a; Teoh 1992, 2 and 16), which gives audit firms an 
incentive to approve whatever financial statements they can 
justify approving. Therefore, in the year of the switch 
(t) , the incoming audit firm does not want to anger the new
switch (t) is discussed at length in section 3.4.
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client by being overly strict in issuing an opinion. 
Moreover, in an initial audit, the auditor might not find 
every audit adjustment that is available to be found due to 
relative unfamiliarity with the client. As Knapp (1988,
52) said, "Users may perceive that since the newly-retained 
... auditor is unfamiliar with the firm, the auditor's 
ability to find and correct errors may be somewhat less 
than if the firm had been a client for several years."
Second, after lowballing, a new auditor tends to raise 
fees each year, but it is not until the fourth year that 
the new auditor typically is charging a full fee to the new 
client (Simon and Francis 1988, 260; also cited in Ettredge 
and Greenberg 1990, 199). Therefore, in the second year of 
the new auditor's tenure (t+1), the risk/reward ratio is 
disproportionately large for the auditor to approve any 
questionable items which would otherwise be considered as 
borderline cases. Since switching to yet another auditor 
would constitute a signal to the market by the client firm, 
the year after the switch (t+1) is the year when the client 
firm is most likely to be "stuck" with its choice of a new 
auditor, no matter what opinion that new auditor deems 
appropriate and no matter what degree of risk that new 
auditor is willing to accept.
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Third, this is not the only study which compares years
before and after switching auditors. Rrishnan and Stephens
(1995, 181) stated:
Our study extends the analysis in Rrishnan (1994) by 
examining the relation between independent auditor 
switching and the audit opinion in the years before 
and after the switch....
However, this may be misleading, because Rrishnan and
Stephens referred in their study to years (t-1), which is
the year before the switch, and t, which is the year of the
switch--but which they called the year after the switch.
This study, by contrast, uses years (t-1), the year before
the switch, and (t+1), the year after the switch.
3.5 Motivation of the Hypotheses--Nontraditional
Motivation
Appendix E contains a playground model which 
originally led to the investigation of auditor switching. 
Because top managers can either select the auditors or 
influence those who do select the auditors, and because top 
managers wish to remain top managers unless they 
voluntarily choose to step down, they have an incentive to 
search out an audit firm which will render the report 
desired. The playground model views the economy as a 
playground with various players, teams, and games, and may
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be used instead of agency theory in at least some 
situations.
As the study progressed, it became clear that the same 
research study could be motivated without regard to the 
playground model. Consequently, the traditional motivation 
follows, and the playground model appears in Appendix E.
3.6 Motivation of the Hypotheses- -Traditional
Motivation
Unless management is attempting to delay the 
disclosure of bad news, then net losses, extraordinary 
items, lower net incomes, and a particular pattern of net 
income adjusted to reverse the effect of extraordinary 
items should occur randomly rather than systematically with 
respect to auditor switches. In this study, net losses are 
assumed to proxy for previous problems--that is, negative 
information--not yet found by the prior audit firm, and/or 
for a selection of net-income-accelerating choices in the 
year of the switch; management would make such choices to 
delay the revelation of negative information. This gives 
rise to the following hypothesis:
H01: Among client companies that switched auditors,
the proportion of client companies with net 
losses in the year after the switch (t+1) was 
less than or equal to the proportion of client
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companies with net losses in the year before the 
switch (t-1).
Hal : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the proportion of client companies with net 
losses in the year after the switch (t+1) was 
greater than the proportion of client companies 
with net losses in the year before the switch (t- 
1) .
An extraordinary item, by definition, is unusual, 
nonrecurring, and material, which implies that it should 
not be possible to predict the occurrence of extraordinary 
items by examining auditor switches.13 This gives rise to 
the following hypothesis:
H02 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the proportion of client companies with 
extraordinary items in the year after the switch 
(t+1) was less than or equal to the proportion of 
client companies with extraordinary items in the 
year before the switch (t-1).
Ha2 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the proportion of client companies with
13With respect to H02 and Ha2, the amount or direction 
(i.e., gain or loss) is not at issue. Rather, the focus of 
H02 and Ha2 is the mere existence (or nonexistence) of an 
extraordinary item. Amount and direction of extraordinary 
items are considered in H04 and Ha4 .
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extraordinary items in the year after the switch 
(t+1) was greater than the proportion of client 
companies with extraordinary items in the year 
before the switch (t-1).
These one-tailed tests constitute a test of explicitly 
disclosed client-company-specific behaviors before and 
after an auditor switch. By structuring the test this way, 
each client company serves as its own control.
The tests for hypotheses one and two are related to 
negative information which is explicitly disclosed to the 
market by management. Management must publicly explain the 
reasons for net losses or extraordinary items or suffer the 
consequences as the market revalues the company. There may 
also exist some negative information which is not 
explicitly disclosed to the market. In that case, the 
negative information would be revealed only indirectly, 
through the company's reporting a smaller net income than 
would otherwise have been reported.
Ball and Watts (1972, 680) reported that accounting 
net "income can be characterized on average as a 
submartingale or some similar process." That is, each year 
the net income is expected to be greater than or equal to 
the preceding year1 s net income. However, Garsombke and 
Armitage (1993, 95) reported that forty-five companies
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which switched, auditors from 1986 to 1986 had 26% lower net 
income in 1987 than 1986. Thus, either net income or the 
direction of change in net income may be associated with 
auditor switching.
If one accepts the Ball and Watts (1972) finding that 
net income is a submartingale, this permits testing for 
negative information which is not explicitly disclosed to 
the market. Further, instead of testing market reaction to 
auditor switches (e.g., Kluger and Shields 1991), an 
indirect test which derives from an expectation, this 
methodology directly tests a fact: what was publicly
reported as audited financial information.14
H03 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the net income in the year after the auditor 
switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to the net 
income in the year before the switch (t-1).
Ha3 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the net income in the year after the auditor 
switch (t+1) was less than the net income in the 
year before the switch (t-1).
14Note that even if the financial statements later are 
deemed to have been misstated, the financial statements 
were still publicly reported at one time. Their 
publication is a fact, even if their representation of the 
financial condition, results of operations, and cash flows 
of the firm are not correct in all material respects.
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Not all extraordinary items need be negative. If 
management decides to finally book a write-off or write­
down, it could also engage in one or more transactions to 
partially or fully offset the negative information. This 
gives rise to the following hypothesis.15
H04 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the net income, adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items, in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to 
the net income, adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items, in the year before the 
switch (t-1).
Ha4 : Among client companies that switched auditors,
the net income, adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items, in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) was less than the net 
income, adjusted to reverse the effect of
15Note that, if management is having a fee dispute with the 
incumbent audit firm (one of the previously hypothesized 
reasons for switching auditors) , but not a problem with the 
services rendered or with the audit firm's application of 
professional standards or judgment, then management is 
concerned only about being overcharged by the audit firm. 
Presumably, when a company switches auditors merely to save 
money, management is investigating a whole range of 
expenditures, not just the audit, to attempt to reduce 
expenditures, and therefore one should expect net income to 
rise, not fall. Further, net income should rise from 
operations, not from utilizing accounting sleight-of-hand.
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extraordinary items, in the year before the 
switch (t-1).
3 . 7 Method
Hypotheses one and two were tested by computing the 
proportions of occurrences (i.e., net losses for H01 and 
extraordinary items for H02) in the last pre-switch year 
(t-1) and the first post-switch year (t+1), then 
statistically testing for differences in proportions, 
computed according to Devore and Peck (1986, 3 85). Due to 
the wide variations in dollar amounts of extraordinary 
items and net incomes, a parametric test for changes in raw 
values was inappropriate because a single change in a high- 
dollar-value company could easily have overwhelmed the 
effects of changes in many lower-doliar-value companies.
Hypotheses three and four were tested using a 
distribution-free sign test (Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 3 9 
et seq.). This test analyzes the direction of movement, if 
any, and results in a pattern of ones (for movement in the 
hypothesized direction) and zeroes. For hypotheses three 
and four, once the direction of movement is determined, the 
ones and zeroes are distributed according to a binomial 
distribution (Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 40) . For a large 
sample, the binomial distribution approximates a normal
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distribution. The sample of 3 05 auditor switches is 
considered a large sample, and therefore the standard 
deviation and the z score were computed according to Devore 
and Peck (1986, 223) .
3.8 Sample Selection
The sample was selected from the Compustat data base 
(a limited subscription to Compustat composed of 4,106 
companies) for the years available in the data base--in 
this case, 1975 through 1994. To be selected, companies 
must have had different auditor codes reported by Compustat 
from one year to the next, plus have had two following 
years of data. The purpose of using multiple years in 
which auditor switches occurred was to guard against any 
systematic effects in the economic environment causing 
auditor changes and/or net losses in particular calendar 
years. Auditor codes were not available from Compustat for 
banks, life insurance, or property and casualty companies 
(Compustat 1994, 5-26), so those companies were excluded 
from selection, but included in the 4,106 companies in the 
limited-subscription data base.
For each company which was determined to have switched 
auditors, and for which sufficient years of information 
existed, data were examined to ascertain whether any
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extraordinary items were reported for the last pre-switch
year and the first post-switch year. This was consistent
with DeFond's (1992, 23) sampling method (quoted below)
which excluded firms that switched again soon after one
switch, but unlike DeFond, this study included firms with
multiple switches.
Firms that switch more than once during a two-year 
period on either side of the selected switch date are 
excluded from the sample in order to eliminate firms 
that may be switching auditors simply to capture the 
short-term advantages of low-balling. (DeFond 1992, 
23)
Additionally, Kluger and Shields (1991, 263) tested 
two bankruptcy prediction models based on companies which 
either switched or did not switch auditors two to three 
years before bankruptcy, and found that the switched 
companies were more likely to go bankrupt. By selecting 
companies which survived two fiscal years beyond switching 
auditors, any possible effects attributable to attempts to 
stave off bankruptcy, or to suppress information concerning 
severe financial distress culminating in bankruptcy, were 
lessened. In effect, a bias which would have operated to 
increase the likelihood of supporting hypotheses three and 
four of this study was either lessened or eliminated by 
this selection requirement.
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3.9 Limitations
This study did not make any distinction between 
auditor dismissals and auditor resignations because this 
study tested for an association between auditor switching 
(regardless of who initiated the switch) and certain types 
of negative information which may have become public after 
the switch. (See Wells and Loudder 1997, 138.) Wells and 
Loudder (1997, 140) stated, "empirical evidence suggests 
that resignations are associated with unfavorable events 
within a firm." There was no reason to infer that the 
negative information being examined herein would differ 
across auditor dismissals and auditor resignations, 
particularly when both dismissals and resignations could 
each be disguised as the other. See Appendix F for 
additional information.
The use of the Compustat data base caused a bias 
against finding the hypothesized effect, even if one 
existed. This bias occurred because the Compustat data 
base companies tend to be larger than the average of all 
publicly-owned companies. Those larger companies are more 
closely followed by market participants who may have, or 
seek, private information which may bear on price movements 
of the companies1 securities. Consequently, the extra 
effort devoted to obtaining information about those
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companies made it less likely that managers could have 
known material negative information and kept it from the 
market for an extended period. Also because the Compustat 
firms tend to be larger than average, they tend to be 
audited mostly by the Big firms, and when they switch, they 
tend to switch within the same size auditors.16 Thus the 
use of this data source might have a tendency to 
underrepresent those companies which were allegedly merely 
"seeking greater credibility" from their auditors by 
switching from a smaller firm to a larger firm.
3.10 Summazrv of this Chapter
This chapter has presented a discussion of the 
methodology used in this study, the research hypotheses, 
the statistical hypotheses, the data sources, and the 
method of testing. Chapter 4 presents some procedural 
matters and the results of the tests of hypotheses.
16In this study, 257 of 3 05 auditor switches were from Big 
firm to Big firm, 16 of 3 05 auditor switches were from Big 
firm to small firm, 26 of 3 05 auditor switches were from 
small firm to Big firm, and 6 of 3 05 auditor switches were 
from small firm to small firm.
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CHAPTER 4
4.1 Results
The structure of the chapter on results is as follows. 
Section 4.2 discusses data quality. Section 4.3 discusses 
data set inclusions and exclusions. Section 4.4 compares 
the results of the tests performed on the full sample 
versus the various subsamples. Section 4.5 discloses the 
results of the statistical tests of hypotheses. Section 
4.6 gives some additional findings observed during the 
study. Section 4.7 presents a summary of this chapter.
4.2 Examination of Data. Quality in the Compustat 
Data. Base
The data for all the companies in the Compustat data 
base which switched auditors were printed and visually 
examined. There appeared to exist some cases of 
questionable data in the data base (e.g., auditor codes in 
successive years of 4, 14, and 4). In such instances, an 
attempted verification of an auditor switch was made via an 
examination of The Wall Street Journal Index for the three 
years (t-1), t, and (t+1) for an announcement of an auditor
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 8
switch. If no such announcement was found, verification 
was made by reference to Moodv's Industrial Manual or other 
appropriate manual in the series (e.g., transportation; 
bank and finance) .
This data examination procedure was followed because 
previous authors have used data sources other than 
Compustat, as shown in Table 5, following, and the present 
author was unaware of any published study which explicitly 
discussed the reliability of Compustat1s auditor data. 
Although Louwers (1993, 45) used Compustat's auditor data 
to compute auditor tenure, and therefore must have computed 
when auditors were switched, he did not discuss any data 
examination procedures beyond noting (3 9) that "non-Big 
Eight auditing firms were not separately identified (prior 
to 1989) on Compustat. ... 1
Visual inspection of the data, combined with reference 
to the various Moody's manuals and the author's personal 
knowledge of combinations among auditing firms, disclosed 
that Compustat auditor codes indicating a pre-1990 change 
from audit code 9 (i.e., all non-Big firms) to a code 1 
through 8 (i.e., Big firm) were unreliable as indicators of 
an auditor switch, due to the great number of audit firm 
combinations during that period. Therefore, all such code 
changes before 1990 were excluded from the sample, although
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code changes from a code 1 through 8 to a code 9 were 
included in the sample because no Big firms were acquired 
by non-Big firms during that period. Further, Compustat 
lumped all non-Big auditors into one code, 9, before 1988 
(Compustat 1994, pp. 5-25 and 5-26), so changes from one 
non-Big firm to another before 1989 were not available in 
the data base. To complicate matters further, an auditor 
switch in 1989 from one non-Big firm to another would 
appear as a change in Compustat auditor code from 9 to a 
two-digit number. For 1989 (i.e., the year of the data 
coding conversion), this was indistinguishable from 
continuing with the same non-Big firm, which would also 
appear as a change in Compustat auditor code from 9 to a 
two-digit number.
4.3 Data. Set Inclusions and Exclusions
In 1989, Arthur Young and Touche Ross ceased to exist 
as independent entities, becoming part of Ernst & Young 
(formerly Ernst & Whinney) and Deloitte & Touche (formerly 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells) respectively (Compustat 1994, 5- 
25) . A visual examination of the Compustat data showed 
some companies which had retained Arthur Young or Touche 
Ross for more than ten years prior to the audit firm 
combinations, but which switched after undergoing only one
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or two audits under the new regime. Those switches were 
included in the auditor switches tested.
Visual examination of the Compustat data, combined 
with references to the Moody's manuals, resulted in the 
exclusion of some companies for reasons such as changing 
the fiscal year at the same time as changing auditors,- see 
Table 6 for a listing and explanation. The same data 
investigation procedure resulted in changing of some data 
reported by Compustat before performing analyses of the 
data set; see Table 7, Part A for a listing and 
explanation. One company was excluded from the data set 
due to possible unreliability of financial data; see Table 
7, Part B. No attempt was made to verify all the Compustat 
data used in this study; verification was limited to 
apparently anomalous data.
There were 3 05 usable auditor switches in the 
Compustat limited-subscription data base: 257 Big to Big
switches, 16 Big to small switches, 26 small to Big 
switches, and 6 small to small switches. Companies which 
switched auditors multiple times were included each time as 
part of the 305 auditor switches, provided the indicated 
switch was not from code 9 to a code 1 through 8 before 
1989. Analyses of switchers by year of switch and by
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Compustat variable DNUM (equivalent to SIC code) are shown 
in Table 8.
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Table 5
Data sources and incidental information 
for authors cited herein who identified auditor switches
Note: n equals number of switches, and may­
be greater than the number of companies 
due to multiple switches by one company.
Authors Year Data source, and this author's
comments17
Anderson, Stokes, and Zimmer 1993 Centre for Independent Studies Takeover 
Data Base (68); authors studied 60 
takeovers to determine whether auditors 
were switched
Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw 1997 Compustat Annual Industrial Tape for 
the years 1980 through 1988 (439); 
their dependent variable R, for 
realignment, was modeled on nine 
variables plus mean value plus error;
17Numbers in parentheses, unless obviously dates, refer to page numbers within 
articles cited.
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Chow and Rice 
Craswell
Danos and Eichenseher
DeBerg, Kaplan, and Pany
Table 5 continued
1982
1988
1982
1991
three of the four statistically 
significant independent variables were 
values for the four years following the 
auditor switch
Leasco Disclosure Journal; n=418 (328)
examination of annual reports of 
companies listed on the Sydney 
(Australia) Stock Exchange during the 
period 1950-79 (26); n=142 (27)
Who Audits America (607); only 
nonregulated client industries with 25 
to 50 publicly owned companies, and 
regulated client industries with 25 to 
100 publicly owned companies (609); no 
direct test of companies which switched 
auditors, so no n available
data source not stated; included only 
changes between Big Eight, and 
companies were listed on NYSE or AMEX 
as of the year of the change; n=83 (21)
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DeFond
Dhaliwal, Schatzberg, and 
Trombley
Table 5 continued
1992
1993
Who Audits America. June 1983; selected 
all 101 switches "that involved a 
change in auditor name-brand {e.g., 
from a non-Big Eight to a Big Eight 
auditor);" DeFond then added 30 
switches which did not involve such a 
change; one firm had incomplete 
information and was not used; n=130 
(23-24)
"The treatment (disagreement) group 
comes from the sample examined in Smith 
(1988) consisting of all clients listed 
on the daily Center for Research in 
Security Prices common equity return 
tape (CRSP) that changed auditors 
between January 1, 1973 and December 
31, 1982, and that reported a 
disagreement in the Form 8-K filing for
the change in auditors........ The
control (no disagreement) group also 
comes from the Smith (1988) sample, and 
consists of companies from the same 
industry as the disagreement firms
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Dunn, Hillier, and Marshall
Eichenseher, Hagigi, 
and Shields
Fisher and Fisher
Table 5 continued
1999
1989
1993
which changed auditors during the same 
ten-year period but did not report a 
disagreement. (26)" There were 71 
auditor changes with disagreements and 
71 changes without disagreements during 
the years 1973 to 1982.
Listing provided by Registrar of 
Companies at Companies House (98); 
n=88. They investigated resignations 
of audit firms in the U.K. during 1988 
to 1993 (98) and found that the market 
reacted negatively.
Who Audits America (35); n=87 OTC 
companies switching between July 1980 
and December 1982 (34)
Who Audits America; sample consisted of 
firms "switching independent auditors 
which have an outstanding bond issue 
listed and rated in Moody1s Bond Record 
during the three year periods prior to 
and subsequent to the switch;" switches 
were 1983-87; n=133 (51)
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Francis and Wilson
Fried and Schiff
Garsombke and Armitage
Gul, Lee, and Lynn
Haskins and Williams
Healy and Lys
Johnson and Lys
Table 5 continued
1988
1981
1993
1992
1990
1986
1990
Who Audits America (670); n=194 in the 
"continuous size" models and n=78 in 
the "brand name" probit models (672)
Corporate Profiles and Index of 
Corporate Events; n=48 (328)
survey sent to firms identified in 
January 1988 Disclosure II database as 
having changed auditors; n=45 (95)
audit reports of Hong Kong listed 
companies between 1981 and 1988 (119); 
n=108 (114) out of 270 listed companies
Disclosure Online Database, SEC News 
Digest, and Who Audits America: had to 
be a switch from one Big Eight auditor 
to another; n=209 for 1986 (59)
Who Audits America: n=110 in 1976 and 
1978 (256-7)
Disclosure Journal and Who Audits 
America: client had to be listed in any 
Compustat data file (Industrial, Over-
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Kluger and Shields
Krishnan
Louwers
Table 5 continued
1991
1994
1993
the-Counter, or Research) in 1984 but 
not a utility, banking, insurance, or 
diversified financial services firm 
(284) ; n=603 cases occurring in 1973- 
1982 (285)
SEC News Digest 1981-1985; sample was 
over-the-counter companies which filed 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy (258); n=36 
bankrupt switchers, paired with 36 non­
bankrupt switchers (259)
Disclosure Inc. data base for 1986-8; 
only companies with data available on 
CRSP (202); n=2,989 (204)
12,599 audit-years from 1992 Compustat 
file (40); auditor switches were 
determined only to compute auditor 
tenure with a client, where tenure was 
the variable of interest; years prior 
to 1984, and companies not audited by 
Big Eight firms, were excluded (38 and 
40); regulated industries were excluded 
(38 and 40)
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McConnell
Nichols and Smith
Raghunandan and Rama
R o b e r t s ,  G l e z e n ,  a n d  J o n e s
Table 5 continued
1984
1983
1999
1990
SEC News Digest for auditor switches 
during the five years ended in 1978 
(47); n=728 (47-8)
(not explicitly stated); switching 
firms had to file a Form 8-K reporting 
change in auditors during the period 
1973-79, the change had to be either 
from a non-Big Eight to a Big Eight, or 
vice versa, the firm was listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange or American 
Stock Exchange, and data was available 
on CRSP; n=51 (537)
Public Accounting Report for 156 
auditor resignations for January 1,
1994 to December 31, 1996. CD-SEC or 
Laser Disclosure for 375 auditor 
dismissals 1995-1997. (128)
school districts' audited financial 
statements and compliance reports, the 
Texas School Directory for the fiscal 
years 1980-81 through 1984-85, and 
other data, plus a survey mailed to all
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Schwartz and Menon
Schwartz and Soo
Simon and Francis
Table 5 continued
1985
1995
1988
1,047 Texas school districts (224); 
n=87 (225)
The Wall Street Journal Index: NYSE and 
AMEX companies which filed bankruptcy 
petitions during 1974 to 1982; n=132 
bankrupt switchers, matched with 132 
non-switchers (253)
sample of firms which filed a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy petition during 1987- 
1992, and that switched auditors within 
three years prior to bankruptcy filing, 
was compiled from The Wall Street 
Journal Index and the National 
Newspaper Index: n=59, matched with 
non-bankrupt sample of auditor 
switchers obtained from COMPUSTAT (127)
Who Audits America, plus samples used 
by Simon (1985) and Francis and Simon 
(1987); sample consisted of 214 
companies which changed auditors over 
the period 1979-84, plus 226 companies 
which did not change auditors
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Smith
Wells and Loudder
Williams
Table 5 continued
1986
1997
1988
SEC Digest, data purchased from 
Disclosure Inc., Compustat, and 
National Automated Accounting Research 
System (NAARS); n=139 for years 1982-84 
(99)
Auditor resignations obtained from the 
8-K filings in LEXIS database 1988 
through 1991; n=86 (140) . Fourteen of 
the firms traded on NYSE or AMEX.
Who Audits America (1983) used to 
select companies; Moody's Industrial 
Manual used to determine length of time 
the company had retained its present 
auditor (250); variables collected from 
Compustat industrial tape and Moody1s 
Industrial Manual (251); n=186 NYSE or 
AMEX companies which changed from one 
Big Eight to another Big Eight auditor 
between 1977 and 1982 (252)
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Table 6
Companies excluded from sample of auditor switches
Company Reason(s) for exclusion
American Stores Co, Auditor was switched simultaneous with change in end of 
fiscal year.
Chiquita Brands Compustat indicates four changes in fiscal year end during 
1975 to 1994.
Craig Corp. Auditor was switched simultaneous with change in end of 
fiscal year.
Decorator Industries Fiscal year end was changed within two years following 
auditor switch.
Dole Food Co Inc. Auditor was switched simultaneous with change in end of 
fiscal year.
FoxMeyer Health Corp. The company changed its fiscal year the year after
switching auditors.
General Motors Class E The company changed its fiscal year the year after
switching auditors.
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Hondo Oil & Gas
Placer Dome 
Ranger Oil Ltd.
Table 6 continued
The auditor switch occurred when Pauley Petroleum bought 
81% of Hondo.
Income and auditor data were incorrect.
The auditor codes per Compustat were 9, 4, 4, and 6 for 
years ended 12/86 through 12/89. Per Moody's, the auditors 
were Thorne Riddell for 1985, Thorne Ernst & Whinney for 
1986 to 1988, and Peat Marwick Thorne for 1989. This 
appears to be the same Canadian audit firm, but the audit 
firm changed affiliations during the period.
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Table 7
Companies excluded (E) or data changed (C) 
Part A. Differences in auditor between Compustat and Moody's
Comoanv FYE
Auditor per 
ComDUStat
Auditor per 
Moodv1s
Avon Products (E) 12/88 6 Coopers & Lybrand
Crystal Oil Co. 12/86 8 Touche Ross
Crystal Oil Co. (C) 12/87 6 Touche Ross
Crystal Oil Co. (C) 12/88 8 Peat Marwick
Crystal Oil Co. 12/89 6 Peat Marwick
CSS Industries Inc. (E) 1/80 8 Arthur Andersen
Gerber Scientific (E) 4/75 N/A Peat Marwick
Gerber Scientific (E) 4/76 7 Peat Marwick
Gerber Scientific (E) 4/77 6 Peat Marwick
Gerber Scientific (E) 4/78 6 Peat Marwick
73
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Lee Pharmaceuticals (E) 9/80
Lee Pharmaceuticals (E) 9/81
Lehigh Group Inc. (E) 12/91
Lehigh Group Inc. (E) 12/92
Noble Affiliates 12/88
Noble Affiliates (C) 12/89
Noble Affiliates 12/90
Placer Dome (E) 12/87
Placer Dome (E) 12/88
Placer Dome (E) 12/89
Placer Dome (E) 12/90
Ply-Gem Industries (E) 12/82
Table 7 continued
5 Deloitte Haskins & Sells
7 Deloitte Haskins & Sells
1 KPMG Peat Marwick in summary-
listing, but mentions Arthur 
Andersen's audit report
11 Arthur Andersen
7 Price Waterhouse
1 Price Waterhouse
1 Arthur Andersen
7 Clarkson Gordon; Price Waterhouse
14 Clarkson Gordon; Price Waterhouse
4 Ernst & Young; Price Waterhouse
7 Price Waterhouse
9 (not determined)
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Ply-Gem Industries (E) 12/83
Ply-Gem Industries (E) 12/84
Republic Gypsum (E) 6/88
Republic Gypsum (E) 6/89
Republic Gypsum (E) 6/90
Republic Gypsum (E) 6/91
Scherer, R. P. (E) 3/89
Scherer, R. P. (E) 3/90
Scherer, R. P. (E) 3/91
Table 7 continued
7 Weinick, Sanders & Co.
9 (not determined)
2 Arthur Young
4 Ernst & Young
1 Ernst Sc Young
1 Ernst Sc Young
1 (not determined)
3 (unable to locate in Moody
1 (not determined)
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Table 7 continued 
Part B. Differences in net income between Compustat and Moody's
Net income per Net income per
Como any FYE Comoustat Moodv's
Placer Dome (E) 12/87 121.672 C$158.2
Placer Dome (E) 12/88 219.996 C$262 .4
Placer Dome (E) 12/89 108.036 C$125.1
Placer Dome (E) 12/90 164.583 C$191.0
Placer Dome (E) 12/91 -236.200 C$236.2 loss
Placer Dome (E) 12/92 111.000 C$111.0
Note: C$ indicates amounts in Canadian dollars. Data sources give net income in
millions of dollars.
76
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 8 
Analyses of audit switches 
by Compustat variable DNUM (SIC code) 
and by year of switch
Part A. Audit switches by Compustat variable DNUM (four-digit SIC code)
Full
Sample
Large Small
less than 1000 0 0 0
1000 series 24 9 4
2000 series 52 19 22
3000 series 110 37 35
4000 series 16 1 2
5000 series 52 19 14
6000 series* 21 1 2
7000 series 20 2 6
8000 series 9 0 3
9000 series 1 _0 _0
Total 305 88 88
"Full" means the full sample.
"Large" means the largest companies, based on price-adjusted total assets. 
"Small" means the smallest companies, based on price-adjusted total assets.
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Table 8 continued
Part B. Audit switches by fiscal years ended within the following calendar years
Sample
Full Large Small
1976 11 6 1
1977 24 4 8
1978 14 3 5
1979 13 3 4
1980 12 1 3
1981 20 5 2
1982 11 3 2
1983 12 1 4
1984 18 7 4
1985 14 6 4
1986 13 3 5
1987 22 6 6
1988 16 2 7
1989 19 8 4
1990 33 11 9
1991 33 11 11
1992 15 7 6
1993 4 1 2
1994 1 _0 _1
Total 305 88 88
See notes on next page.
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Table 8 continued
"Full" means the full sample.
"Large" means the largest companies, based on price-adjusted total assets.
"Small" means the smallest companies, based on price-adjusted total assets.
*Auditor codes are not available for banks, life insurance, or property and casualty 
companies (Compustat 1994, 5-26), so those companies are excluded.
Part C. Audit switches by fiscal years ended within the following calendar years-- 
comparison to Cheney, Jeter, and Shaw's (CJS) population drawn from 
Compustat full subscription
This study CJS study
1976 11
1977 24
1978 14
1979 13
1980 12 23
1981 20 23
1982 11 18
1983 12 16
1984 18 35
1985 14 38
1986 13 38
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4.4 Performance of Tests on Full Sample and
Siib-fiampl as
All tests were performed three ways: (1) on the full
sample (n=3 05) of auditor switches, (2) on a reduced sample 
(n=177) separated by size into a larger half (n=88) and a 
smaller half (n=88) , and (3) on the full sample by size of 
audit firm (i.e., Big to Big, Big to small, small to Big, 
small to small). Because size of the company being audited 
may be a proxy for any number of unidentified variables, 
only those companies which switched auditors for which 
total assets for the year preceding the switch could be 
manually obtained from Moody1s Industrial Manual were 
included in the tests by size; this effectively tested for 
both size and the attention hypothesis.
The total assets from the year preceding the auditor 
switch was used to separate switching companies by size 
because there may have been unusual occurrences or 
transactions which significantly changed total assets, and 
which were associated with the auditor switch, making the 
year preceding the switch (t-1) a better data source than 
the year of the switch (t). Because total assets 
represented different fiscal years with different real 
purchasing power, the total assets were then normalized
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(1982=100) using annual average producer prices from 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, 491.
There were 177 companies with total assets for the 
year preceding the auditor switch available from Moodv1 s 
Industrial Manual. The other companies either were not 
industrial companies, were not based in the United States, 
had unreliable data in Moody's (such as those switchers in 
which new companies were formed to acquire existing 
companies) , or were not available in the Moodv1 s Industrial 
Manual. Those 177 companies for which data were available 
in Moody's Industrial Manual were separated into two halves 
by size of 88 companies each; the median company was not 
included.
The information for the full sample was drawn from the 
Compustat computer data base (limited sample), while the 
information for the reduced sample tested for larger half 
and smaller half (88 auditor switches in each half) was 
obtained manually. There were no differences in results 
between (1) the full sample, (2) either of the samples by 
asset size, nor in (3) the auditor switches categorized by 
size of audit firm. Accordingly, the discussion of results 
in Chapter 4 is limited to discussion of the full sample.
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4.5 Results of Statistical Tests of Hypotheses
4.5.1 Statistical hypothesis one; Among client companies 
that switched auditors, the proportion of client companies 
with net losses in the year after the switch (t+1) was less 
than or equal to (alternative hypothesis: greater than)
the proportion of client companies with net losses in the 
year before the switch (t-1).
The statistical test could not reject the null 
hypothesis. There were fewer client companies (sixty-five 
companies) with net losses the year after the switch than 
the year before the switch (seventy-four companies) , which 
was the opposite of the prediction. Because the null 
hypothesis had no chance of being rejected unless there 
would have been more companies with net losses the year 
after the switch than there were the year before the 
switch, and that is not what was found in the sample, no 
test statistic was computed.
The results mean that, on average, the data do not 
support the joint supposition that (1) management changed 
auditors with the intent of delaying reporting net losses 
until the year following the auditor switch, and (2) they 
were successful in obtaining such delay. Even if that 
indeed was the reason for some or all of the switches, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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conclusion is nevertheless not statistically supportable 
from this sample.
As an aside, there were 117 instances in which net 
income for the year of the switch (t) was lower than the 
year preceding the switch (t-1) . Thus, if management did 
wish to delay reporting net losses until the fiscal year 
following the year in which they switched auditors, it 
appears that their success in doing so was limited--perhaps 
by the new auditors.
4.5.2 Statistical hypothesis two; Among client companies 
that switched auditors, the proportion of client companies 
with extraordinary items in the year after the switch (t+1) 
was less than or equal to (alternative hypothesis: greater
than) the proportion of client companies with extraordinary 
items in the year before the switch (t-1) .
Hypothesis two was tested by computing the proportions 
of occurrences of extraordinary items in the last pre­
switch year and the first post-switch year, then 
statistically testing for differences in proportions, 
computed according to Devore and Peck (1986, 3 85) . The 
null hypothesis (Devore and Peck 1986, 385) of no 
difference between the two proportions of occurrences was
H o: nx - n2 = o
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where (piL) was the population proportion for population 
one and n2 (pi2) was the population proportion for 
population two. The formula for conducting the test 
(Devore and Peck 1986, 3 85) is
z = Pi ' Pt.
P C(1-PJ p(l-p)
\ n„
where pc was the common probability of success, px was the 
proportion of successes in sample one, p2 was the 
proportion of successes in sample two, nx was the sample 
size of sample one, and n2 was the sample size of sample 
two.
The computation was as follows. The single-sample 
probability of success (that is, the proportion of 
switchers that had extraordinary items) for the year 
preceding the auditor switch, denoted as px, was 68/305, or 
0.222951, while the single-sample probability of success 
(that is, the proportion of switchers that had 
extraordinary items) for the year after the auditor switch, 
denoted as p2, was 75/3 05, or 0.245902. As an intermediate 
step to computing the z statistic, it was necessary to know 
the common probability of success, denoted as pc, which was 
found by the formula (Devore and Peck 1986, 3 85)
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The terms have already been defined. The two sample 
sizes, nx representing the year before the auditor switch 
and n2 representing the year after the auditor switch, were 
each 305. These were different fiscal years for the 
companies which switched auditors.
Substituting in the equation immediately above to find 
the common probability of success, one obtained
which reduced to 0.234988. Then, substituting in the 
equation to compute the z score, one obtained
0 . 2 2 2 9 5 1  -  0 . 2 4 5 9 0 2
which reduced to -0.668461. This was not statistically 
significantly different from zero, and therefore the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected.
This means that research hypothesis two (among firms 
that switched auditors, the proportion of firms with
0 . 2 4 5 9 0 2
z
0 . 2 3 4 9 8 8 ( 1 - 0 . 2 3 4 9 8 8 )  
3 0 5
0 . 2 3 4 9 8 8 ( 1 - 0 . 2 3 4 9 8 8 )
3 0 5
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extraordinary items in the year after the switch was 
greater than the proportion of firms with extraordinary 
items in the year before the switch) was not supported.
The observed increase in firms with extraordinary items 
from sixty-eight in the year before the auditor switch (t- 
1) to seventy-five in the year after the auditor switch 
(t+1) did not constitute a statistically significant change 
in proportion. Separately, it was observed that there were 
seventy firms with extraordinary items in the year of the 
auditor switch (t), which was not statistically 
significantly different from the sixty-eight firms in year 
(t-1) .
4.5.3 Statistical hypothesis three: Among client companies
that switched auditors, the net income in the year after 
the auditor switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to 
(alternative hypothesis: less than) the net income in the 
year before the switch (t-1).
Hypothesis three of no change in direction of net 
income was tested using the Fisher distribution-free sign 
test (Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 39-40). The null 
hypothesis was expressed (Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 39) as
Ho: 0 = 0
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Although, not explicitly defined in the text, theta 
represents the amount of movement of a sample from the 
population, or of one sample from another. The indicator 
variables were defined (Ibid.) as
W± = 1 Lf Zt > 0
and
W± = 0 if Z± < 0
Psi (Y) was simply an indicator variable, and Z was the 
indicator variable (one or zero) associated with a pair of 
sample observations when the numerical value of one member 
of the sample pair was compared to the other member of the 
sample pair. The test statistic B was computed as follows 
(Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 39):
"The statistic B is the number of positive Z's (Hollander 
and Wolfe 1973, 39)." Thus, the test statistic B 
represented the number of times in the sample the movement 
from one number to its matched pair was in the hypothesized 
direction.
For a large sample, Hollander and Wolfe (1973, 40) 
showed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
B - E l B ) 
B* = °
[var0 (B) ]1/2
in which the numerator was the test statistic, B, minus the 
expected value of B, and the denominator was the square 
root of the variance of B. To impose a severe condition 
for rejecting the null hypothesis, net income was assumed, 
for purposes of the statistical test herein, to be a random 
variable with equal probability of rising and falling, 
which caused the expected value of B to equal n/2 . Note 
that this was contrary to the Ball and Watts (1972, 680)
expectation of rising net income because an expectation of 
zero lower net incomes appeared unrealistic, and any other 
proportion of lower net incomes would necessarily have been 
arbitrarily selected.
The sample standard deviation could have been computed 
in either of two ways; both gave the same answer.
sample standard deviation = ^  (305)(0.5) (0.5)
or
sample standard deviation = ^ n
1
In both cases, the sample standard deviation was computed 
as 8.732125. When the sample is large, Hollander and Wolfe
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(1973, 40) show that B* is approximately normally
distributed. Thus, substituting, one obtained
z ]
8 . 7 3 2 1 2 5
which reduced to z = -3.60737. The observed number (that 
is, 121) of lower net incomes was fewer than the expected 
number (that is, 152.5), where the expected number was 
based on this study's assumption that net income varies 
randomly, rather than the Ball and Watts (1972, 680) 
expectation that net income rises. The statistical test 
resulted in a failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Research hypothesis three (the net income in the year 
after the auditor switch was less than the net income in 
the year before the switch) was not supported according to 
the theory utilized in this study for income expectation.
If one were to use Ball and Watts' (1972, 680) income 
expectation of rising net income and therefore zero 
expected lower net incomes, the computation would have been 
121 observed lower net incomes minus zero expected lower 
net incomes, all over 8.732125, for a z value of 13.9.
Using the Ball and Watts (1972, 680) income expectation, 
hypothesis three did have strong support.
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There were 121 instances, out of 3 05 switches, in 
which the net income in the year after the auditor switch 
(t+1) was less than the net income in the year before the 
switch (t-1) . Under the extremely restrictive income 
expectation adopted, and related test performed, no 
statistical significance to the incidence of lower incomes 
would have been found unless some number of lower incomes, 
statistically significantly greater than 153, would have 
been observed.
Ignoring sideways movements, there were four possible 
patterns of movement of net income in the year of the 
switch (t) and the following year (t+1) : up up, up down,
down up, and down down. In one pattern out of four (up up) , 
the end state (i.e., the year following the auditor switch, 
or [t+1]) should be unambiguously up. This pattern of 
unambiguously up was the expectation for net income 
according to Ball and Watts (1972, 680) who reported that 
accounting net "income can be characterized on average as a 
submartingale or some similar process." That is, each year 
the net income is expected to be greater than or equal to 
the preceding year1 s net income. In one other pattern out 
of four the end state should be unambiguously down, but the 
two remaining patterns do not produce an unambiguous
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expectation for the year following the auditor switch 
unless the magnitudes of movement are fixed.
4.5.4 Statistical hypothesis four; Among client companies 
that switched auditors, the net income, adjusted to reverse 
the effect of extraordinary items, in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to 
(alternative hypothesis: less than) the net income,
adjusted to reverse the effect of extraordinary items, in 
the year before the switch (t-1) .
Research hypothesis four was tested the same way as 
research hypothesis three. The z score was computed as
8.732125
which reduced to -3.95093. The observed number (that is, 
118) of lower net incomes, adjusted to reverse the effect 
of extraordinary items, was fewer than the expected number 
(that is, 152.5), where the expected number was based on 
this study's assumption that net income varies randomly, 
rather than the Ball and Watts (1972, 680) expectation that 
net income rises. The statistical test resulted in a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Research hypothesis four, given the income expectation 
used for this study, was not supported. However, as was
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the case with hypothesis three, the results of the test of 
hypothesis four depend on the expectation used for 
direction of net income. In this study, net income was 
treated as a random variable which could have moved up or 
down, resulting in hypothesis four not being supported. 
There were 118 instances out of the 3 05 auditor switches in 
which the net income, adjusted to reverse the effect of 
extraordinary items, was lower in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) than in the year preceding the switch 
(t-1) .
By contrast, if one were to have used Ball and Watts' 
(1972, 680) income expectation of rising net income and 
therefore zero expected lower net incomes, the computation 
would have been 118 observed lower net incomes minus zero 
expected lower net incomes, all over 8.732125, for a z 
value of 13.5. Using the Ball and Watts (1972, 680) income 
expectation, hypothesis four would have been strongly 
supported.
Table 9, following, gives the results for each of the 
statistical tests.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
Table 9
Results of the statistical tests
H01 H02 He3 H04
Full
sample
Pi 74 68
P2 65 75
B 121 118
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
8 . 732 8.732
z not
computed
not
computed
-3.607 -3.951
Large-
company
half
Pi 18 12
P2 14 25
B 31 30
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
6. 633 4.690
z not
computed
not
computed
-8.593 -2.985
Small-
company
half
Pi 26 20
P2 22 22
B 35 35
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
6.633 4.690
z not
computed
-0.353 -7.990 -1.919
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H01 H02 H03 H04
Big to 
Big
Pi 56 55
P2 50 66
B 98 96
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
not
computed
8 . 086
z not
computed
-1.140 not
computed
-4.055
Big to 
small
Pi 9 7
P2 6 5
B 7 6
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
not
computed
2 .000
z not
computed
0 . 726 not
computed
-1.000
small to 
Big
Pi 7 6
P2 8 3
B 17 15
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
2 . 550 2 .550
z -0.354 1.056 1.569 0 . 784
small to 
small
Pi 2 0
P2 1 1
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Table 9 continued
H01 Hc2 H03 Ho4
B 3 1
standard
deviation
not
applicable
not
applicable
not
computed
1.224
z not
computed
-0.775 not
computed
-1.632
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4. 6 Addi tiona.1 Resul ts
There were some additional results obtained in the 
course of analyzing the data. These results may be even 
more interesting than the results of the tests of the 
hypotheses. As stated earlier, "For the general event of 
auditor switches, there is some evidence...which indicates 
that there is negative market reaction around the time of 
the announcement of the switch. The difficulty in 
interpreting this result is that it is not clear what 
motivates this reaction." (Fried and Schiff 1981, 338-9) 
Among the 3 05 auditor switches in the sample, there were 80 
instances in which the net income in both of years t and 
(t+1) were lower than in year (t-1). There were 109 
instances in which there was a net loss for one or both of 
years t and (t+1). Given that 109 instances is more than 
one-third of the entire number of auditor switches tested 
herein, it appears that an auditor switch by a publicly- 
owned company is frequently a predictor of negative 
information which has not yet occurred nor arrived in the 
market.
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4. 7 Summary of this Chapter
This chapter has presented the results of the tests of 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the findings, 
the contributions of this study, and the implications for 
further research.
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CHAPTER 5
5.1 Concluding Remarks
The structure of the chapter on concluding remarks is 
as follows. Section 5.2 presents an interpretation of 
results. Section 5.3 presents the contributions of this 
study. Section 5.4 presents the implications for further 
research. Section 5.5 presents a summary of this chapter.
5.2 Summary of Results
The results of the study are summarized in this 
section. A separate subsection is provided for each of the 
four hypotheses tested.
5.2.1 Statistical hypothesis one: Among client companies
that switched auditors, the proportion of firms with net 
losses in the year after the switch (t+1) was less than or 
equal to (alternative hypothesis: greater than) the
proportion of client companies with net losses in the year 
before the switch (t-1).
Stated in terms of the research hypothesis, the 
expectation was for more companies with net losses the year
99
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after the switch than the year before the switch, but the 
test found fewer client companies with net losses the year 
after the switch than the year before the switch. The 
statistical test could not reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, the research hypothesis was not supported.
5.2.2 Statistical hypothesis two: Among client companies
that switched auditors, the proportion of client companies 
with extraordinary items in the year after the switch (t+1) 
was less than or equal to (alternative hypothesis: greater
than) the proportion of client companies with extraordinary 
items in the year before the switch (t-1) .
Hypothesis two was tested by computing the proportions 
of occurrences of extraordinary items in the last pre- 
switch year and the first post-switch year, then 
statistically testing for differences in proportions.
Stated in terms of the research hypothesis, the expectation 
was for more client companies having extraordinary items in 
the year after the switch than the year before the switch. 
However, the statistical test could not reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, the research hypothesis was not 
supported.
5.2.3 Statistical hypothesis three: Among client companies
that switched auditors, the net income in the year after 
the auditor switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to
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(alternative hypothesis: less than) the net income in the
year before the switch (t-1).
Hypothesis three of no change in direction of net 
income was tested using the Fisher distribution-free sign 
test (Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 3 9-40) . Stated in terms of 
the research hypothesis, the expectation was for more 
client companies having lower net income in the year after 
the switch than the year before the switch. Using the 
expectation of random movement of net income, the
statistical test of hypothesis three could not reject the
null hypothesis. Therefore, the research hypothesis was 
not supported. On the other hand, anyone who would have 
used the Ball and Watts (1972) expectation would have found 
strong support for this hypothesis.
5.2.4 Statistical hypothesis four: Among client companies
that switched auditors, the net income, adjusted to reverse 
the effect of extraordinary items, in the year after the 
auditor switch (t+1) was greater than or equal to 
(alternative hypothesis: less than) the net income,
adjusted to reverse the effect of extraordinary items, in
the year before the switch (t-1).
Hypothesis four was tested the same way as hypothesis 
three, using the Fisher distribution-free sign test 
(Hollander and Wolfe 1973, 39-40). Stated in terms of the
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research hypothesis, the expectation was for more client 
companies having lower net income, adjusted to reverse the 
effect of extraordinary items, in the year after the switch 
than the year before the switch. Using the expectation of 
random movement of net income, the statistical test of 
hypothesis four could not reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, the research hypothesis was not supported. On 
the other hand, anyone who would have used the Ball and 
Watts (1972) expectation would have found strong support 
for this hypothesis.
5.3 Interpretation of Results
The pattern of results obtained in the testing of the 
hypotheses herein is consistent with a conclusion that 
managers are, on average, limited in the amount of time 
they can delay revelation of material bad financial news to 
the market. The data pattern does not show any greater 
number of net losses the year after an auditor switch than 
the year before, nor any greater number of extraordinary 
items the year after an auditor switch than the year 
before. This implies that auditors of publicly-owned 
companies which are switching auditors tend to do a 
professional job in not permitting the companies to 
routinely delay recognition of negative information in the
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financial statements. This is consistent with Krishnan and 
Stephens (1995, 179), who said that "clients who switched 
were treated relatively conservatively by both predecessor 
and successor auditors...."
One may argue that the socialization of auditors is 
such that, by the time an accountant becomes a partner of a 
major accounting firm entrusted with leading the engagement 
of a publicly-owned company, that accountant is aware that 
a risk exists that new clients may have something they 
would rather gloss over, and so the audit partner does not 
even commit his firm to undertake the engagement unless 
they can perform it properly. Further, audit firms are not 
required to accept prospective audit clients, and audit 
partners are cognizant that they might not want all the 
audit engagements offered to the firm. In short, if the 
audit is too risky, the firm's procedures are designed to 
lessen the likelihood that the engagement would even be 
accepted.
This study contains no test of whether recognition of 
negative information was delayed during the time the 
relationship was better, during any years preceding the 
year of the auditor switch (t). In fact, even if some 
disclosure had indeed been delayed in previous fiscal 
periods, it may be that an audit firm's insistence on
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recognizing negative information, or a client firm's 
realization that the negative information cannot be delayed 
any longer, is what caused the relationship to deteriorate, 
thereby leading to a switch.
5.4 Limitations and their Effects
As explained in Section 3.9, the use of the Compustat 
data base caused a bias against finding any of the 
hypothesized effects, even if one or more existed. This 
bias occurred because the Compustat data base companies 
tend to be larger than the average of all publicly-owned 
companies. Those larger companies are more closely 
followed by market participants who may have, or seek, 
private information which may bear on price movements of 
the companies1 securities. Consequently, the extra effort 
devoted to obtaining information about those companies made 
it less likely that managers could have known material 
negative information and kept it from the market for an 
extended period.
Choices were made during this study, such as using an 
expectation of random movement of net income rather than 
the Ball and Watts (1972) finding that net income is a 
submartingale, which may have resulted in unnecessarily 
severe constraints against finding the hypothesized
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relationships even if they exist. For example, although no 
support was found for hypotheses three and four using the 
expectation of random movement of net income, there was 
strong support if one were to use the expectation of 
increasing net income. Thus, even thought this study 
reports a finding of no support for the hypotheses, the 
hypotheses might still be worthy of further investigation, 
and replication by a researcher using the full Compustat 
data base over a longer or different time period than that 
used herein.
5.5 Contributions of this Study
The contributions of the study are summarized in this 
section. A separate subsection is provic&ed for each of 
five contributions. Other contributions, including the 
Playground Model, are documented in the various appendices.
5.5.1 Data source used: This study uses a data source, the
Compustat data base, which has not been utsed much in 
previously published journal articles on auditor switching. 
(In fact, when the study was begun [in 19*96] , the author 
found no previously published study of au_ditor switching 
which had used this source, although at 1 east one article 
subsequently appeared.) The author's investigation of the 
underlying data indicates that (1) switches among non-Big
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Eight auditors are not available before 1989, (2) auditor
code changes before 1990 which appear to indicate a change 
from non-Big Eight auditors to Big Eight auditors might 
actually be the result of a business combination of audit 
firms, and therefore should be subjected to further 
investigation, and (3) auditor codes should be visually 
examined over multiple years before using the codes as a 
basis for auditor switching studies.
5.5.2 What are managers doing? While previous authors have 
stated or implied that managers are attempting to influence 
the auditor, this study shows that managers might be 
attempting to avoid the auditor.
5.5.3 What is being tested? As explained in Chapter 3, 
this study tests information contained in publicly reported 
financial statements rather than market reactions to 
auditor switches. Thus the study' s tests are of facts 
(what was publicly reported--even if what was publicly 
reported was not correct) rather than of expectations 
(market reactions).
5.5.4 What years are involved in an auditor switch? This 
study demonstrates that the years of concern might be the 
year before the auditor switch (t-1) , the year of the 
auditor switch (t), the year after the auditor switch
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(t+1) , some other year relative to the auditor switch, or 
some combination thereof.
5.5.5 What does an auditor switch, tell the market? Based 
on the data set employed of 3 05 switches (including 257 
Big-to-Big switches) which show 109 instances in which 
there is a net loss for one or both of years t and (t+1) , 
and 80 instances in which net income is lower in both years 
t and (t+1) than in year (t-1), it seems that auditor 
switches by publicly-owned firms are frequently a predictor 
of bad financial news which has not yet occurred nor 
arrived in the market.
5. 6 Implications for Further Research
Although this study did not find that a desire to 
delay the revelation of negative information is the 
motivation for companies changing auditors, that still does 
not rule out the possibility that it is a possible 
motivation and this study simply failed to establish that. 
Krishnan and Stephens (1995, 194) stated that "it is 
difficult to determine the actual reason for the change in 
auditors...." Moreover, Krishnan and Stephens (1995, 180) 
examined opinion shopping as a possible motivation for 
auditor switching, and noted:
Although many independent auditor changes may be
unrelated to opinion shopping, the inherent
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difficulties in determining the real reasons for 
change (McConnell 1984) make it impossible to 
ascertain the relative importance of opinion shopping 
in independent auditor change situations.
Thus, if any motivation sounds intuitively appealing
to members of the profession, it may indeed account, wholly
or partially, for some auditor switches, whether or not
academic researchers can statistically find supporting
evidence. The multitude of possible and actual reasons for
switches may make it difficult or impossible to
statistically support that reason or other reasons, even if
valid.
Some possible future studies which would extend this 
work would include (1) examining cash flows from operations 
rather than income-statement figures, (2) testing for 
differences among individual Big firms, and (3) using 
expectations other than random movement of net income 
(e.g., the Ball and Watts [1972, 680] income expectation 
discussed earlier in this study).
5. 7 Summary of this Chapter
This chapter has presented a summary of the findings, 
the contributions of this study, and the implications for 
further research.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE ECONOMIC BAD
A. 1 An Economic Bad
Appendix A discusses an alternative hypothesis which 
might explain why at least some companies switch auditors. 
Prior authors had not reported any explicit consideration 
of the alternative hypothesis that the audit contains 
elements of an economic bad.
An economic good is something which, if obtained for 
zero cost, leaves the acquirer better off. However, there 
also exists an economic bad, which leaves the costless 
acquirer worse off. People are willing to pay a premium 
(i.e., a price) to avoid an economic bad, as can be seen 
from the existence of the insurance industry and also from 
the existence of the crimes of blackmail, extortion, and 
kidnapping.
Arguably, research to date has implicitly assumed that 
the audit is an economic good only. In contrast, if one 
properly understands that the audit also contains elements 
of an economic bad, then it becomes obvious that some 
companies might switch auditors to avoid an economic bad 
(disclosure of negative information) when given the
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opportunity to obtain an economic good, (the audit opinion) 
without the economic bad.
A. 2 Prior Authors Gave Evidence of An
Economic Bad
Even though prior authors have not addressed the 
economic bad embedded in the audit and associated audit 
report, it is clear that they admitted that the economic 
bad exists and is associated with the audit:
1. Fisher and Fisher (1993, 51) stated: "Qualified 
audit opinions are widely believed to (be) a
maj or factor for switching independent auditors.
A qualified opinion is perceived to have an 
unfavorable effect on the firm's stock price and 
its ability to borrow funds.
2. Krishnan (1994, 214) reported that rates of 
auditor switching "seem to be higher when 
qualified opinions are based on conservative 
application of standards," i.e., when the quality 
level of the audit is higher than that desired by 
managers.
3. Krishnan and Stephens (1995, 189) reported that 
"the switching rate is not only positively 
associated with the receipt of a qualified
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opinion. . ., but increases with the seriousness of 
the qualification."
4. Roberts, Glezen, and Jones (1990, 227-228) 
studied Texas school districts and reported 
results which "suggest that auditors may be 
replaced for reporting information that reflects 
negatively on the school board," (i.e., the 
management group).
5. Teoh (1992, 2) recognized the possibility that 
"qualifications are costly."
6. In publicly owned companies, "managers wish to 
avoid qualified opinions because they may affect 
(a) the market price of the firm's shares and (b) 
the managers' compensation packages (Gul, Lee, 
and Lynn 1992, 112, citing Chow and Rice 1982) ."
A. 3 Prior Authors Gave Evidence That Managers 
Want A Particular Audit Report
Some managers might want a particular audit report, 
whether they deserve it or not. Consider what the 
following authors have said.
1. Williams (1988, 247) said, "Managers would prefer 
to select an accommodating auditor who would 
allow the manager to reflect a favorable image as 
a good steward of the shareholder's investment.
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An auditor who (a) allows agents to favorable 
interpret accounting principles in order to 
achieve a specific goal and (b) issues favorable 
opinions, are examples of an auditor helping to 
create the manager's image as a good steward."
2. Chow and Rice (1982, 332) reported results that, 
after controlling for size and industry, appeared 
to indicate that Price Waterhouse was less likely 
to qualify an opinion than other Big Eight firms. 
Wheeler, Pany, and Chewning (1993, 49) reported a 
similar finding.
3. Simunic (1980, 180-181) reported that client 
companies pay a higher fee for an audit by Price 
Waterhouse than by other Big Eight firms. As 
stated immediately preceding, Price Waterhouse 
was less likely to qualify an opinion than other 
Big Eight firms. (However, this does not rule 
out the possibility that clients perceive the 
firm to be better because it has developed 
sufficient expertise to be able to accurately 
give clean opinions when other firms would have 
hesitated, and the clients are willing to pay a 
higher price for a better firm.)
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A. 4 Giwmaxrv
This appendix illustrated that managers have 
incentives to attempt to avoid bad outcomes. Because 
undesired audit reports could have negative consequences 
for managers, this appendix has therefore demonstrated that 
the audit contains elements of an economic bad, not just an 
economic good.
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APPENDIX B 
AUDITOR SIZE AND AUDIT QUALITY
B.l Mistaking Auditor Size for Audit Quality
Various authors (DeAngelo 1981b, 184; Becker, DeFond, 
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1988, 1; and Krishnan 1994,
211;) have stated that just because the audit firm receives 
higher prices, it is better. By omitting any consideration 
of other causes for the fact pattern observed, they have 
implicitly or explicitly concluded there can be no other 
cause which would result in the same fact pattern. 
Admittedly, their published articles do not report whether 
the conclusion was made implicitly or explicitly. See 
Table 10, following.
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Table 10
Bigness has been equated with high quality-
Author(s) Authors1 positions Comments, if any
DeAngelo (1981b, 184) "the current paper argues 
that size alone alters 
auditors' incentives such 
that, ceteris paribus, 
larger audit firms supply a 
higher level of audit 
quality."
"DeAngelo defines audit 
quality as the joint 
probability of detecting 
and reporting material 
financial statement
errors........ Taken
literally, DeAngelo's 
argument suggests that a 
cardinal ordering of 
auditor size can be used to 
proxy for audit quality." 
(Francis and Wilson 1988, 
664)
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Table 10 continued
DeAngelo (1981b, 184), 
continued
If one accepts the 
supposition that larger 
size means higher quality, 
then if two accounting 
firms merge but change 
nothing, the merged firm is 
higher quality than either 
constituent firm.
Laventhol & Horwath grew by 
merger, but suffered a 
lowering of audit quality, 
and went bankrupt.
Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, 
and Subramanyam (1988, 1)
"Consistent with prior 
research, we treat audit 
quality as a dichotomous 
variable and assume that Big 
Six auditors are of higher 
quality than non-Big Six 
auditors."
If auditors learn through 
education, on-the-job 
training, and experience, 
why do they consider an ex- 
Big Six auditor working for 
a small firm to be lower 
quality than a present Big 
Six auditor who has not yet
received the on-the-job
training and experience?
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Table 10 continued
DeFond (1992, 16) DeFond defined quality "as 
the probability that the 
auditor will both detect and 
report material breaches in 
the accounting system."
Since large accounting 
firms tend to have 
portfolios of large 
clients, material financial 
statement errors ought to 
be less likely to occur 
among such clients, because 
(1) the dollar threshold of 
materiality is higher, (2) 
such large client firms, 
possessing large pools of 
assets desirable to 
individuals, must typically 
have good operational 
controls and internal 
controls to enable them to 
survive, and (3) such large 
client firms can afford to 
hire the best employees, 
managers, specialists, and 
consultants.
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Table 10 continued
DeFond (1992, 16), 
continued
Thus, the large audit 
firms' portfolios ought to 
consist of firms which are 
less likely to have 
material financial 
statement errors than the 
portfolios of small audit 
firms.
Elitzur and Falk (1999, 41 
and 42)
With respect to an auction 
for audit services, "a 
bidder may under-estimate 
the client's audit cost and 
subsequently reduce audit 
quality."
Because of their large 
portfolios of audit 
clients, the largest firms 
can afford to reduce audit 
quality to meet budget 
targets rather than purely 
as a considered 
professional response to 
what is found during the 
audit examination.
120
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 10 continued
Ettredge and Greenberg 
(1990, 200)
"If the Big Eight supply a 
higher-quality product, 
ceteris paribus, the product 
can be expected to have a 
higher price."
If smaller firms would not 
give a clean opinion but a 
larger firm would, the 
larger firm ought to be 
able to charge a higher 
price, especially if the 
audit client should not 
have received a clean 
opinion. These authors 
have not ruled out 
alternative explanations 
for the higher price.
Krishnan (1994, 211) He assumed that Big Eight 
firms are better quality, 
but did not prove his 
assumption. "Clients that 
switch from non-Big Eight to 
Big Eight auditors are 
defined as movers in search 
of credibility."
All it shows is that the 
clients switched. The 
reason for the switch is 
assumed, not proved.
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Table 10 continued
McConnell (1984, 45) "Underwriters frequently 
pressure companies issuing 
securities to obtain Big 
Eight audit opinions on the 
ground that a better 
offering price may result. 
Arnett and Danos (1979) 
suggest that a 'Bigness 
Syndrome' exists--the 
perception that bigness 
equals competence and 
quality...."
General Motors must have 
been the best automobile 
manufacturer in the world 
at one time. Why would 
their customers ever have 
bought cars from any other 
companies, such as Japanese 
companies, to get higher- 
quality automobiles?
There has been no evidence 
proving that underwriters 
have actually investigated 
the quality of audits of 
various firms, rather than 
doing what is convenient 
for themselves and 
supplying a cover story for 
why they want the client 
company to switch auditors.
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Table 10 continued
Palmrose (1986, 108) "The observed result, i.e., 
higher audit fees for Big 
Eight firms, is consistent 
with either higher quality 
services or monopoly pricing 
by the largest suppliers," 
and concluded "that the Big 
Eight designation is a 
quality surrogate."
The possibility exists that 
audit purchasers are paying 
for a brand name rather for 
intrinsic quality. Francis 
and Wilson (1988, 663) 
reported support for a 
brand name model of audit 
quality.
Palmrose (1986, 108), 
continued
Large audit firms, on 
average, might use more 
audit staff with less 
experience than do other 
firms who hire Big alumni. 
Therefore the large audit 
firms must spend more time 
on an audit and have a 
higher production cost for 
an audit, but they might 
have sufficient market 
power to charge a higher 
price.
1 2 3
1 2 4
Auditors at non-Big firms, technical personnel at the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and 
state boards of accountancy can point out that all auditors 
are responsible for the same body of knowledge, the same 
requirements for entrance to the profession, the same 
licensing requirements, and adherence to the same 
professional standards. Accountants in non-Big firms can 
claim that they do at least as good a job as the larger 
firms. Given that this second tier, by size, of audit 
firms is relatively stronger in middle-market companies 
(where owners are more likely to manage the business, or to 
have more-concentrated ownership interests) than in large 
publicly-owned companies (where ownership is likely to be 
dispersed and management is in the hands of agents) , at 
least the following four possibilities exist:
1. It may be that second-tier audit firms actually
perform higher-quality audits than the Big firms, 
and this is precisely the reason managers prefer 
the Big firms while owners prefer the second 
tier.18
18Gul, Lee, and Lynn (1992, 111) reported that "small audit 
firms issue more qualified reports than large audit firms, " 
but small firms may have riskier client portfolios, or 
portfolios of smaller clients for whom any given event must 
result in a qualified report, whereas the same event would 
be immaterial to a larger client. Thus, the fact that 
small audit firms issue more qualified reports than large
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2. It may be that smaller audit firms provide audits 
equal in quality to those of the Big firms, but 
the smaller audit firms do not charge as much.
3. It may be that smaller audit firms provide lower- 
quality audits than Big firms provide, but those 
lower-quality audits fulfill the needs of the 
purchasers and users of audits.
4. Regardless of the relative quality of audits 
performed by Big firms compared to audits 
performed by smaller audit firms, some purchasers 
of audits prefer to save money rather than buy 
the higher-priced audits of the Big firms. In 
the minds of the people paying the bill for at 
least some audits, they have a choice between 
paying a high price to have expensive people 
travel from out of town, charge them for travel, 
rental cars, hotel rooms, and meals in addition 
to the fee for the professionals' time spent 
doing the audit versus paying a lower fee for a 
smaller firm which is within daily commuting 
distance and which might even use more
audit firms does not lead inexorably to a single 
conclusion.
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professional hours on the audit while still 
charging a lower fee.
Whichever is true, the Big firms are not higher 
quality in a way which determines the decisions of some 
purchasers of audits or else those purchasers would have 
bought their audit services from the Big firms. Using an 
analogy, while the highest-priced brand of car in the world 
might or might not also be the highest-quality brand of car 
in the world, it is not the only car which will get a 
person from Point A to Point B. Moreover, there may be 
some people who want and can afford less-expensive cars, 
but who cannot afford the most expensive car in the world.
B.2 Evidence That Bier Firms Produce High-Quality
Audits
Evidence exists that the Big firms cannot all be 
producing only low-quality audits, although some subset of 
offices or employees may be producing some small number of 
audits which are subsequently deemed low quality. (See 
Palmrose 1988 and St. Pierre and Anderson 1982 and 1984 for 
articles concerning lawsuits against accounting firms. If 
all audits were high quality, then presumably there would 
be few actual or threatened lawsuits against auditors.)
One of the Big firms had a well-defined program of 
financial support for audit research. This would be
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irrational if it recognized its own product as being low- 
quality and wished to keep it so. Support for audit 
research is consistent with an evaluation of competitors' 
quality as high (in which case the research would improve 
the environment in which auditors operate) , and also with 
an evaluation, of competitors' quality as low (in which case 
the research results would help the firm gain a competitive 
advantage).
Other Big firms did not have the same well-defined 
program of support for audit research. Nevertheless, each 
of those firms has provided ad hoc funding and access to 
audit researchers. This is not consistent with a rational 
action by a low-quality producer, since it would enable the 
identification of such a firm as a low-quality producer.
In an open society such as the United States, it is 
doubtful that such an identification--if one were made-- 
could be suppressed for long. However, published research 
exists on audit firm structure, auditor decision making, 
auditors' interpretation of terminology, the ethical levels 
of auditors at various stages of firms' hierarchies, and 
other topics, without any finding that even one of the Big 
firms is a low-quality producer. Surely if one or more Big 
firms were to be identified as nothing but low-quality 
producers of audits, it would have been learned and
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publicized by now. The absence of such evidence is 
suggestive, but not determinative, that Big firms are not 
low-quality producers of audits.
B . 3 If Biaaer Really Did Necessarily Mean Better
It is interesting to analyze what we would observe if 
a bigger organization really did mean the organization was 
better. We would not see many Japanese-brand vehicles on 
U.S. roads, because General Motors had more than half the 
market at one time; by this theory, General Motors must 
have been better than everyone else combined, so why would 
anybody be foolish enough to buy a vehicle from anyone 
else? Wal-Mart would never have grown beyond a single 
store, because Sears and K-Mart were large chains. A T & T  
would never have grown to any great size, because Western 
Union was already a large company which permitted people to 
communicate with each other. McDonald's would never have 
been able to attract franchisees, because White Castle 
already had many stores. U. S. students would leave U. S. 
universities and attend large foreign universities instead.
Consider this easily observed fact: in each of these
instances, the people who made the purchasing decisions 
made the choice of buying from a smaller organization 
rather than a larger organization. This indicates that the
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larger organizations were not better to people who made 
purchase decisions, or else those people would have 
purchased from the larger organizations. Assume that the 
people who paid the money were maximizing their own 
utility. Because the smaller organizations successfully 
attracted purchasers, one can conclude that the people who 
paid the money found the smaller organizations to be better 
(i.e., higher quality on one or more dimensions which 
mattered) than the larger organizations. Thus, bigger does 
not necessarily equate to higher quality in the instances 
mentioned above, and there is no proof that the audit 
market is a special market where rules apply everywhere 
else in the universe except in that special market.
B .4 Summary
This appendix has considered whether a relationship 
necessarily and monotonically exists between auditor size 
and audit quality. This appendix has demonstrated that 
while the Big firms do produce high-quality audits, the 
mere fact that they are indeed Big does not automatically 
mean that they inevitably must be higher quality than 
smaller firms. As discussed in Appendix C, some purchasers 
of audits may desire a less than high-quality audit.
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APPENDIX C
THE MARKET FOR AUDIT OPINIONS 
AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS
C.l The Market for Audit Opinions - -Consumer/
Purchaser View
If purchasers of audits seek out (1) a particular size 
of audit firm, or (2) audit firms which the purchasers 
perceive as being less strict in application of accounting 
principles and judgments, or (3) audit firms which the 
purchasers perceive as being more likely to render a clean 
opinion even if those firms detect something which raises 
questions in the minds of the people performing the audit 
procedures, then the market for audits is not a homogeneous 
market as previous authors may have consciously assumed, or 
may have implicitly assumed by the structure of their 
research. Rather, it is a segmented market in which firms 
produce audits at varying quality levels as demanded by the 
market segments. Those purchasers of audit services would, 
in at least some fiscal years, have an incentive to pay 
extra to avoid the more-strict outcomes perceived as bad. 
This would result in lenient firms garnering more business, 
and at higher prices, than their competitors.
This line of reasoning suggests that the price premium 
received by the largest firms may not be a premium for
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higher quality, but rather for a relative level of quality 
demanded by at least some purchasers of audits. The 
absolute level of quality still meets professional 
standards, but the purchasers of audits are paying a 
premium price to be sure they get what they want: an
unqualified audit opinion with no major adjustments to the 
financial statements.
However, Krishnan (1994, 201) said,
"... evidence... suggests that opinion shopping is generally 
futile." If significant quality differentials existed in 
the market for audit opinions, as would be the case if the 
largest firms were more lenient or lower quality than 
smaller firms, and if some providers of audit opinions did 
not provide audits of professional quality, then opinion 
shopping would be effective, not futile. Thus, if Krishnan 
was correct that opinion shopping is futile, another 
possibility exists: there are high-quality firms at both
the Big and non-Big size level, but the Big firms are 
simply better at selling. Perhaps the Big firms became Big 
because they were better at selling their services, whether 
or not they were better at performing the work.
Are some firms better than others at selling? Yes.
For example, when George Bailey went out on his own as a 
sole practitioner, he took Chrysler with him as a client
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(Grayson 1998, 25) . Bailey then combined with other firms 
to become Touche, Niven, Bailey and Smart, which became the 
Touche Ross firm, now part of Deloitte and Touche (Ibid.). 
Not many small accounting firms obtain clients the size 
Chrysler was at that time. If any small accounting firm 
were to obtain one or more clients that size, the 
accounting firm would grow larger very quickly.
C.2 The Market for Audit Opinions--Supplier View
Do managers wish to avoid losing high pay, stock 
grants, stock options, perquisites which go with their 
positions, above-average pension programs, etc.? Do they 
wish to avoid having to search for another position which 
would be at least the equivalent? The answer ought to be 
obvious. Conceptually, if managers did not care about 
these things, we should observe a significant number of 
managers quitting their jobs with no definite plans of what 
to do next. On the other hand, if managers do care about 
such things, and if a negative audit report might cause 
them to lose their positions, pay, and perks, then managers 
would have an incentive to find an audit firm which would 
render the audit report they desire.
Can managers can avoid a bad audit report by finding 
an audit firm which will render the managers1 desired
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report, even if that desired report is not deserved? Watts 
and Zimmerman (1979, 287) took the position that anyone who 
was willing to pay for an excuse or argument could find 
someone willing to furnish it for a price: "Given the
rewards for supplying theories on controversial issues, we 
expect to observe competition in the supply of accounting 
theories related to those issues. " The same theory in 
their argument applies to audit opinions. One could easily 
take the theory and state their position as, "Given the 
rewards for supplying opinions on financial statements, we 
expect to observe competition in the supply of audit 
opinions related to those financial statements." Thus, 
even if some auditors may be unwilling to render a clean 
opinion on a particular set of financial statements, other 
auditors, for a sufficiently high fee, may be willing to 
look for ways to justify the issuance of a clean opinion.
Watts and Zimmerman's argument can imply a higher fee 
for a lower-quality audit, but it can also imply a higher 
fee for a higher-quality audit. Consider the case in which 
an audit firm understands that the client wants a clean 
opinion. In order to be sure that the clean opinion 
desired by management really is deserved and can be 
justified, the audit firm assigns higher-quality personnel 
than would typically have been assigned to the audit, and
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permits a larger time budget for the engagement. Precisely 
because management of the client company is willing to pay 
such a high fee for the desired audit report, the audit 
firm can afford to expend more resources yet still make a 
big profit on the engagement. Thus, by paying a high price 
for an audit, managers find an audit firm to do the audit, 
the audit firm overaudits if necessary to be able to 
justify its opinion, and the client-company managers 
receive the audit report they wanted.
Managers might attempt to find an audit firm which 
would render the audit report they desire even if they 
cannot in actuality find such an audit firm. Particularly 
if managers have an internal locus of control, they might 
believe they can control something which they cannot 
control. Some people buy lottery tickets and select their 
own numbers. Conceptually, some of these purchasers are 
attempting to control the numbers which will be drawn for 
the prize--but most lottery tickets lose.
C.3 Capital Markets Considerations
An auditor switch is publicly available information 
which can be used by the capital markets to revalue 
security prices. The fact of the switch can also be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
related to other occurrences such as subsequently reported 
financial statements. The market associates an auditor 
switch with negative information, as evidenced by the 
following studies.
1. "For the general event of auditor switches, there 
is some evidence...which indicates that there is 
negative market reaction around the time of the 
announcement of the switch. The difficulty in 
interpreting this result is that it is not clear 
what motivates this reaction." (Fried and Schiff 
1981, 338-9)
2. Garsombke and Armitage (1993, 95) reported that 
forty-five companies which switched auditors from 
1986 to 1987 had 26% lower net income in 1987 
than 1986.
3. Johnson and Lys (1990, 305) reported negative 
excess returns to common stock for the thirty-six 
months preceding announcement of an auditor 
change.
4. Fisher and Fisher (1993, 50) reported "that 
clients are likely to experience decreasing bond 
ratings prior to and subsequent to switching 
independent auditors. 1
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5. Raghunandan and Rama (1999, 125) reported that 
"many auditor resignations occur in potentially 
litigious situations."
6. Dunn, Hillier, and Marshall (1999, 95) examined
only auditor resignations, and find a negative 
reaction.
7. Dunn, Hillier, and Marshall (1999, 97) cited a
working paper of Davidson and Gribbin (1995) , in 
which Davidson and Gribbin examine "3 6 auditor
changes in the period 1983 to 1993 and found that
the announcement of an auditor change was 
accompanied by a negative abnormal return. "
8. Teoh (1992, 2) said
the stock price response to the announcement 
of an auditor change depends on the 
preswitch audit opinion. Specifically, the 
stock price reaction to a switch will tend 
to be more negative after a clean than after
a qualified opinion.............. management
intimidation of the auditor does not itself 
determine investors' reaction to an auditor 
switch.
However, association standing alone, without theory, 
is not sufficient to establish causation. The hypothesized 
causal chain whereby negative information leads managers to 
purchase audits from companies other than incumbent 
auditors (i.e., to switch audit firms) is discussed in 
Section 3.2 of Chapter 3.
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C. 4 Summary
This appendix has considered the audit in the context 
of markets. Prior researchers who have assumed that client 
companies switched from lower-quality auditors to higher- 
quality auditors have not explained why the markets 
interpret auditor switches as either constituting, or else 
being associated with, negative news. Conceptually, 
switching from a lower-quality auditor to a higher-quality 
auditor, when the new, higher-quality auditor will charge a 
lower fee than the prior auditor (as established by 
DeAngelo 1981a, 114), ought to be good news, but that is 
not how the market reacts. Thus, researchers who say the 
auditor switch is from lower-quality auditor to higher- 
quality auditor, when the market reacts negatively, 
implicitly take one of two positions:
1. the market is correct. (If the switching cost 
were worthwhile compared to the cost savings on 
the audit, the market would have revalued the 
company upward. Because the market revalues the 
company downward, the market is concluding that 
the switching cost makes the switch not 
worthwhile. Therefore, client companies should 
never switch auditors.)
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2. the market is wrong. (The market lowers the 
value of a company which takes an action 
reasonably expected to improve its 
profitability.)
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APPENDIX D 
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:
ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION
D. 1 A Non-Homogeneous or Non-Fungible Product
This Appendix D discusses another alternative 
hypothesis, besides the one in Appendix A, which might 
explain why at least some companies switch auditors: 
asymmetry of information. Assume that managers typically 
have information which stockholders do not have. Observe 
that the audit is a non-homogeneous or non-fungible product 
with a standard label. While the language of an audit 
report is standard across firms, the conduct of the audit 
and the formation of an opinion are not. Auditors are free 
to exercise professional judgment in expanding or limiting 
scope, designing and conducting tests, deciding what 
evidence is competent and relevant, interpreting the 
evidence, and deciding how much evidence it takes to be 
sufficient.
While this does point to a situation where auditors
have some power over managers, managers are not powerless
with respect to auditors. Managers are free to obtain a
replacement for an auditor who performs a more thorough
audit than management desires, who performs a less thorough
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 2
audit than management desires, who takes too long to 
complete the audit, who is too intrusive on the personnel 
of the company, who keeps assigning different personnel to 
the audit (whether within one year or over successive 
years) , or who charges too much. When auditors are 
replaced, whether by being fired or by ostensible 
resignation, that is a publicly disclosed event which 
conveys information to the market.
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Table 11
Second alternative hypothesis not reported 
as having been considered by prior authors
Alternative hypothesis Implication(s) Comments, if any
There is an information 
asymmetry between managers 
and stockholders, plus a 
non-homogeneous product 
with a standard label.
While the language of an 
audit report is standard 
across firms, the conduct 
of an audit (including the 
formation of an opinion) is 
not standard across firms.
Managers interview auditors 
before selecting an audit 
firm. They can therefore 
contract for the level of 
quality they desire (which 
does not have to be the best 
quality available) without 
disclosing the quality level 
to stockholders.
Gul, Lee, and Lynn (1992, 
113) reported: "Would not 
another auditor just render 
the same opinion? If a 
qualified opinion is not 
the correct opinion, and 
the correct opinion is an 
unqualified opinion, then 
why is management unable to 
convince the auditor before 
issuance of a qualified 
opinion?"
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Table 11 continued
Kluger and Shields (1991, 
257) referred to "the 
extent that the company is 
successful in predicting 
whether a new auditor will 
be cooperative...."
Teoh (1992, 2) recognized 
"the need to search and 
solicit presentations from 
potential auditors...." 
Addams and Davis (1994, 38) 
referred to this time, from 
the standpoint of the 
prospective selectee, as 
the courting stage.
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Table 11 continued
Craswell (1988, 23) stated: 
"For example, as early as 
1904, Dodd discussed the 
role of auditors in 
Australia and suggested 
that it was the view of 
managers that 'a too 
vigilant watch-dog must be 
cleared out, and one of 
less pronounced efficiency 
substituted for him."
(1904, p. 777)
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Table 11 continued
In situations where 
information asymmetry does 
not exist, or at least is 
not so pronounced, there is 
no need to pay a premium 
price to make the owners 
believe that managers are 
obtaining a high-quality 
audit, because owners either 
know or can ascertain the 
actual quality level. If 
significant owners are also 
the managers, because they 
are paying the cost of the 
audit, they may be less 
likely to pay the premium 
price charged by the Big 
firms.
Kamin and Ronen (1978, 141) 
reported differences in 
smoothing behavior between 
management-controlled firms 
and owner-controlled firms. 
This suggests that owner- 
managers and hired managers 
may have different utility 
functions, and therefore 
different purchasing 
behaviors, concerning 
reported financial results 
and the related audits.
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D.2 The Signaling Function of the Audit
By contracting at a high price with a brand-name 
auditor which is known to be capable of producing high- 
quality audits, both management and the auditor imply that 
the audit is high quality, whether it really is or not.
The payment of a high price itself implies high quality, 
because to the stockholders, it does not appear rational to 
pay a high price for low quality. To the managers, it is 
rational to always pay a high price, no matter what quality 
level is actually contracted for, because by doing so, the 
price always signals high quality while managers have 
actually contracted for a desired audit report. In the 
United States, large publicly-owned companies 
overwhelmingly have their audits done by the Big audit 
firms, which charge higher fees than smaller audit firms.
The managers consider that they are paying a high 
price for an audit report, and the audit firm had better 
provide it. The audit firm, in return for the high fee, 
wants to provide the desired audit report if it can justify 
doing so, but adherence to professional standards means 
that the audit firm cannot always provide the desired audit 
report. Thus, to the managers who contracted at a high 
price, the audit firm which requires adjustments to be made 
to the financial statements or else it will not render a
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clean audit opinion has not provided the contracted-for
audit report. This situation may lead to auditor
dismissals or auditor resignations.
As quoted immediately below, Healy and Lys (1986, 253)
assumed that larger audit firms are higher quality than
smaller firms, and suggested that client companies want the
audit reports they wanted, rather than the audit reports
they may sometimes have deserved.
We view auditor investments in reputation or brand 
name as serving two related functions. First, they 
represent a bond by the audit firm to assure its 
clients that they will receive contracted-for audit 
quality (see Klein et al. 1978, and Klein and Leffler 
1981) . If the audit firm fails to supply the 
contracted-for quality, it dissipates the value of its 
brand name capital. Second, brand names signal the 
audit firm's quality to the readers of the audit 
report, lowering their information costs.
However, client-company managers have an incentive to
"receive contracted-for audit quality" without that quality
necessarily being the highest quality available. Managers
might be perfectly willing to use the company's money to
pay a high fee to a brand-name auditor, even if the auditor
misses something the managers do not want the auditor to
find and report, because that proper technical outcome
would be bad politically for the managers.
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By using a large, brand-name auditor, the contracted- 
for quality level is harder for a user of financial 
statements to assess. "...the costs of assessing audit
quality increase if the audit firm supplies different 
quality audits to each client, since it is costly for the
users of audit reports to distinguish differences in
quality across clients (Healy and Lys 1986, 253) . "
However, they immediately stated, "The audit firm therefore 
has an incentive to supply the same quality to all its 
clients (Ibid., 253-254)."
While the audit firm may have an incentive to supply 
the same quality to all its clients, this is not the one 
and only incentive experienced by the audit firm. Auditors 
are capable of operating at differing quality levels. (If 
auditors were not capable of operating at different quality 
levels, then audit firms and internal audit departments 
would hire only from certain accounting programs, since 
graduates of other accounting programs would be unable to 
operate at the quality level of that employing entity. 
Moreover, accounting programs would supply graduates to a 
small set of mostly unchanging employers, since those 
employers would be the only ones operating at the quality 
level of the graduates of the programs.) If auditors are
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paid to supply audits of differing quality, the incentive 
of payment may be stronger than the incentive of uniformity 
of quality level. Indeed, DeFond (1992, 16) stated that 
"differing quality levels are demanded by clients...."
D.4 Summary
In reviewing the literature and analysis related to 
the information asymmetry between managers and stockholders 
and also the non-homogeneous or non-fungible product with a 
standard label, it appears that more firms than just the 
Big firms are capable of producing high-quality audits.
The Big firms tend to receive higher prices for audits, and 
so the Big firms are relatively more attractive to manager- 
controlled firms which engage in signaling than to owner- 
controlled firms which have no need to conduct such 
signaling.
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APPENDIX E 
THE PLAYGROUND MODEL
E.1 Introduction
This is the playground model which originally gave 
rise to the notion that managers may switch auditors in 
order to delay the disclosure of negative information.
This model is the nontraditional motivation mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Section 5 which gave rise to this study.
Because of its broad intuitive and logical appeal, the 
model may be useful on its own and also as an alternative 
to agency model formulations.
The playground model is the creation of the author. It 
is formulated as a sports analogy because many business 
magazines, in interviews and profiles, report sports 
analogies--some used by business leaders and some used by 
the people who write about those business leaders. The 
analogies are not confined to one sport. The business 
leaders themselves are often referred to as "captains of 
industry." Captains play team sports, not individual 
sports.
One strength of the playground model is that it 
depicts the behavioral complexities of team play. In 
essence, the model suggests that "it's not how well you
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play the game, it's whether you get to continue to play the 
game." The reason that how well you play the game does not 
matter is that captains can make decisions to cause the 
team's individual score to be approximately what the 
captains decided ahead of time they wanted it to be, and on 
which they placed bets.
The appendix is organized as follows. First, the 
playground model is presented. Second, the significance of 
the model is discussed in terms of its critical underlying 
assumption. Third, the relationship of the model to 
auditor switching is discussed. Fourth, additional 
considerations concerning auditor switching are discussed. 
And finally, limitations of the model are provided.
E.2 The Playground Model
It has been said that "the difference between men and 
boys is the cost of their toys." Heads of large companies 
are referred to as "captains of industry." Let us think of 
the economy as a big playground. There are various teams 
(companies, non-profit organizations, government agencies, 
etc.) playing various games on different parts of the 
playground. The teams have to pay various charges (i.e., 
fees and taxes) to use the playground. Spectators pay a 
fee to watch (i.e., buy goods and services), but may go to 
any convenient part of the playground to watch the games
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and teams they like best (i.e., may buy from any seller 
willing to engage in the transaction).
The players themselves report the scores of the games 
while the games are in progress, either privately (e.g., 
file tax returns) or publicly (i.e., periodically publish 
financial statements). One of the team members is 
designated as scorekeeper (i.e., chief financial officer) 
and he can get other members to help with the task. Teams 
can score in numerous ways, including what they have 
already done several plays ago (e.g., valuation of 
inventory) and what they claim they will do in the future 
(e.g., valuation of accounts receivable at their net 
realizable value).
Betting (i.e., purchase and sale of securities and 
options) is permitted on some of the teams which have 
previously told the adults that they will permit betting 
(i.e., they have registered securities) .19 Key team 
members are encouraged to engage in this betting, despite 
the fact that they are betting against spectators (i.e., 
the public) and that team members know what plays they are 
going to call, how aggressively they intend to play, and 
can even rig the score by recruiting new team members,
19Note that this is consistent with Jensen and Ruback 
(1983, 43) who discussed the possibility "that the 
corporation has no owners. Instead, stockholders are 
agents ... who specialize in riskbearing."
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kicking existing team members out, or ending play ev^en when 
they could have continued the game. Key team members have 
another advantage through attendance at inter-team 
conferences (e.g., industry conferences, management 
training sessions), where they can learn information- which 
enables them to place better bets on the performance- of 
many teams in addition to their own.
To attempt to assure reasonably accurate report ing of 
scores, teams on which betting is permitted are required to 
have verifiers (i.e., auditors) periodically tell th^e 
spectators and the adults whether or not each team's score, 
reported separately by each team, is reasonably clos*e to 
the true score. This score is the score of the team , not 
the score of the game. These verifiers spend little or no 
time watching the teams play; mostly they go over thae 
records kept by each team's own scorekeeper, who, as you 
recall, is a team member. In order to establish some sense 
of order in how verification should be done, 
representatives of the verifiers have gotten togetheor to 
draw up some rules concerning the verification process, but 
it is mostly up to the verifiers themselves to comply with 
their own group's rules.
When performing a verification, before the verifiers 
tell the spectators and the adults what they think off the
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reported score, the verifiers get the scorekeeper and the 
team captain to sign a paper saying that the score reported 
by the team really is the score (i.e., a representation 
letter). The verifiers also have a relatively new 
requirement to report whether the scorekeeping method looks 
as though it can be used to keep a reasonably accurate 
score (i.e., make a representation on the state of internal 
accounting control).
Since it is cumbersome for the spectators to find 
other spectators to take the opposite side of a bet, there 
are some betting booths set up in the various spectators' 
stands (i.e., geographic areas). The concessionaires who 
run these booths (i.e., securities firms) make money in two 
ways: first, by handling more bets (i.e., increasing
trading volume), and second, by making good bets for 
themselves (i.e., trading for their own accounts). If the 
concessionaires want to handle more bets, this means that 
at least some of their bettors have to win, so the 
concessionaires employ guessers (i.e., securities analysts) 
to guess what teams will report what scores. The guessers 
are usually able to improve their guesses by talking to key 
members of the various teams. Maybe in return for 
indicating what their own team is likely to report as a 
score, some of the key team members are given information
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about what scores other teams are likely to report; that 
would be a plausible motive for sharing private team 
informat ion.
The concessionaires have been able to make good bets 
by noting betting imbalances and placing the 
concessionaires' own bets before those for spectators who 
bet (i.e., front-numing) . The concessionaires are also in 
a position to act more quickly than the spectators on what 
the guessers find out from key team members; they can post 
what the guessers say, and immediately act, while the 
spectators are still trying to figure out what the posted 
information means.
From time to time, not all the playground is usable, 
as when night falls and only a portion of the playground is 
lit (e.g., economic contraction). In such a case, some of 
the teams shrink so they can continue to play their games 
in a smaller space, while other teams disband entirely 
(i.e., companies lay off employees or even go out of 
business entirely) . When this happens, individuals who are 
no longer playing on a team are reduced to looking for 
another team which will invite them to play (i.e., search 
for other employment) , or to try to start their own team 
(i.e., become self-employed). At least some of the 
children who do not get to play on any of the teams,
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whether through never being selected or through being 
expelled, are paid to be spectators (i.e., receive welfare 
payments or other transfer payments). However, since these 
paid spectators have little money to spend on the best 
admission seats or to spend on refreshments or to bet, few 
teams or players bother to court them as an audience.
One event which strikes fear into the hearts of the 
key members of the various teams is losing control over 
their teams to the occasional playground bully (i.e., 
corporate raider). When that happens, they are likely to 
go looking for an adult (i.e., judicial system or 
government intervention) to help them keep their places on 
their teams.
To tell the truth, the key members of the various 
teams have an even bigger fear: teams from other
playgrounds (i.e., countries) coming and using this 
playground. The captains, especially, are afraid that the 
spectators and bettors will like the other players better 
(i.e., buy imported goods and services), especially if the 
other teams play a more skillful or more exciting game 
(i.e., produce better goods and services).
The adults (i.e., governmental and judicial system) 
tell the children playing the games to play their best, 
according to the rules, and try to win. The adults tell
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the verifiers to be sure that the scores reported are 
honest ones. Thus, the stated obj ective for the teams 
(i.e., companies) is to do well (i.e., turn in a good 
performance), whereas the children quickly learn that the 
real objective is to continue to play. To continue to 
play, the team has an incentive to report a score that the 
bettors (i.e., market) want to hear, rather than the score 
they ought, to hear (i.e., the truth as defined in some 
absolute sense).
Likewise, the stated objective for the verifiers is to 
do a good job verifying (i.e., auditing), and getting the 
teams to report the scores they ought to report, but the 
verifiers quickly learn that the real objective is to have 
teams to verify. If the verifiers do not have teams to 
verify, they will have to try to join a team (i.e., leave 
public accounting for industry, government, or a non-profit 
organization) , try to find teams that will use them as 
verifiers (i.e., start their own public accounting firm), 
or go home (i.e., become unemployed).
The playground can get somewhat complicated, because 
from time to time the adults change the rules concerning 
playing and scoring. If any player or verifier tells any 
adult or bettor that the team is not playing or scoring 
according to the rules, the "almost inevitable" response is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 0
to kick that individual off the team (i.e., fire him), and 
sometimes even off the playground (i.e., frustrate his 
efforts to get another decent job) (National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, 114).
There are some controversies on the playground.
1. Some of the teams on which there is no betting not 
only play by unclear rules, but also have no accepted 
standard way of scoring points (i.e., governmental 
accounting, and achievement of program goals).
2. There are people dealing mood-altering drugs (i.e., 
management fads which turn out to be ineffective at 
improving performance) .
3. Some of the teams and bettors claim that when night 
comes and the field is poorly lit, so that the usable area 
shrinks, certain of the teams on which no betting is 
permitted (i.e., government agencies) get first pick of 
where to play on the remaining lighted portion (i.e., have 
the power of taxation to assure that they continue in 
existence) regardless of how well they are playing.
4. Since the adults want certain games to be played on 
the playground, and want certain game scores to occur, 
those same no-betting teams pay money to other teams to get 
them to play the games the adults want played (i.e., give 
contracts, tax breaks, debt guarantees, etc., all of which
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have been authorized by legislation). However, sometimes, 
and especially when the usable area of the playground 
shrinks at night (i.e., economic contraction), those 
subsidized teams do not or cannot play the desired game and 
achieve the desired score. When that happens, the no­
betting team has to hire a team to play the preselected 
game and obtain the preselected score; this is more 
expensive than merely offering a team an inducement to play 
a different game than they were going to play.
5. The adults have forced the boys to let the girls 
play, instead of just being cheerleaders, but the girls say 
that the boys still will not let them into positions where 
the girls can call the plays.
E.3 An Assumption Underlying the Playground 
Model Which is a. Significant Contribution 
to the Understanding of Too Managers
Rather than assuming that people get utility only by 
scoring points and winning (i.e., beating the competition), 
this model assumes that people get utility by continuing to 
play the game (i.e., be employed). At an adult level, 
payment is received for playing the game. If people get 
their utility only by winning games, they would seek the 
best players for the team, regardless of gender, race, or 
ethnic background, and coach (i.e., mentor) them as
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necessary-/ but even a casual observation of the playground 
leads some people to believe that this has not happened.
In this view, scoring some minimum expected number of 
points is necessary so that the team supports the team 
member, but beyond the minimum, there is little reward to a 
non-key team member personally- for scoring more points, 
while there is a risk that if he scores "too many" points 
over a period of time, the key team members will come to 
expect such scores from him on a regular basis, and expel 
him if he does not continue to produce them. This 
expulsion may occur even if he is objectively better than 
any possible replacement. Also in this view, the team's 
score and number of games won are important only in that 
they must be good enough to induce people to continue to 
pay to watch the games (i.e., buy from the company) and/or 
to bet on the outcome (i.e., trade the company's 
securities).
This model allows for the possibility that verifiers 
get utility by having games to verify (i.e., entities to 
audit and provide other services to) , rather than solely by 
doing a good job. When utility is received through having 
games to verify, verifiers' strategies include:
1. attempting to obtain agreements to verify many 
teams (i.e., grow in number of clients served).
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2 . providing a level of verifying which does not
provoke too many complaints from the bettors
(i.e., investors) about being too lax.
3 . providing a level of verifying which does not
provoke too many complaints from the teams (i.e.,
clients) about being too strict concerning the 
number of points scored, particularly where the 
scoring of points by a strong team may be subject 
to variations in estimates or in interpretation 
of the rules of play.20
Once in a great while, the adults suspect that at 
least some of the verifiers have not been doing a good job 
(e.g., various Congressional investigations). However, 
unless the adults themselves are going to do the job, there 
appears to be no danger to the verifiers of losing the 
verification franchise.
E.4 Relationship to Auditor Switching
This concept of team play leads to the realization 
that when audit firms give anything other than an 
unqualified opinion, or appear ready to, then management
20Knapp (1985, 207) , in a study of the ability of auditors 
to resist management pressure, reported "that auditors are 
perceived to be most susceptible to client pressure in 
those situations where the client is financially strong and 
the conflict issue is not dealt with precisely by technical 
standards."
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might feel the auditors are no longer "on the team" and
therefore should be replaced. Thus, although Smith (1986)
examined audit reports which contained other than
unqualified opinions, yet failed to find any cause for
auditor switching, perhaps the type of report is not as
important as the feeling by management that someone is or
is not on the team. In short, Smith was looking at a
different motivation than the one hypothesized in this
study. Further, as McConnell (1984, 46) stated,
Not acknowledging known unreported disagreements in 
his exhibit letter reviewing client disagreement 
assertions allows an auditor to avoid potential 
litigation, as well as the stigma of being "a poor 
loser."
Thus, other authors have implicitly accepted the concept of
using games to explain phenomena related to auditor
switches. This playground model illustrates that people
with power on their own teams want to continue to play, so
they have an incentive to replace too-strict verifiers of
their team's score with less-strict verifiers. This gave
rise to the concept that client companies have an incentive
to seek out lower-quality auditors when they perceive their
incumbent auditors as higher quality than managers desire.
Concerning auditors, it is important to remember from
the playground model presented herein:
This score is the score of the team, not the score of 
the game. These verifiers spend little or no time
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watching the teams play; mostly they go over the 
records kept by each team's own scorekeeper, who, as 
you recall, is a team member.
One event which strikes fear into the hearts of the 
key members of the various teams is losing control 
over their teams....
...the stated objective for the verifiers is to do a 
good job verifying (i.e., auditing), and getting the 
teams to report the scores they ought to report, but 
the verifiers quickly learn that the real objective is 
to have teams to verify.
E.5 Naturalistic Observations from the 
Playground
Sports are generally played on a surface or field of 
some type. Upon reflection, a playground has many 
similarities to a psychological view of the economy, even 
if a playground is not a perfect model. This study uses a 
playground as the generic location for playing sports, and 
assumes this playground to be the functional equivalent of 
self-selected analogies in verbal protocols by many 
subjects over a long period. Top-level managers are 
referred to as captains.
If we observe children playing a pick-up game, we see 
them choose sides and play the selected game. Sometimes, 
one side is so far superior to the other that the losing 
side no longer wants to play. When that happens, we often 
see the winning side voluntarily exchange some of its good 
players with the losing side. From this, it is evident
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that there are people who get utility from playing the 
game, not merely from winning the game. Further, at the 
adult level, so long as there is a sufficient payment to 
induce someone to play, there is utility derived from 
playing, in addition to the utility derived from the 
payment. This contrasts with previous research in which 
authors have implicitly assumes that people get utility 
only from winning.
Because team captains and other key team members 
obtain utility by continuing to play, they have an 
incentive to do what is necessary to assure both that (1) 
they can continue to play and (2) they either remain in 
their accustomed positions or else move to a better 
position. This means they have an incentive to suppress, 
or at least delay the disclosure of, negative information. 
Kicking people off the team who claim negative information 
exists (i.e., whistleblowers) (National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, 114) is consistent 
with an attempt to suppress or delay disclosing negative 
information. Although such termination of whistleblowers 
does not prove that unreported negative information exists,
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the information provided by whistleblowers often is 
subsequently verified.21
E. 6 Managers' Need for Power; Whv Whistleblowers 
Get Fired
Top managers score high on McClelland's need for 
power. In fact, it is their dominant motive from among 
McClelland's trichotomy of needs for affiliation, 
achievement, and power (Harrell and Stahl 1984, 242). 
Disposing of whistleblowers is consistent with an attempt 
to exercise more power than a competitor. Even if no 
unreported negative information presently exists, an 
expulsion (1) signals that the captain does not want any 
future negative information to be reported before he is 
ready to allow it to be reported, (2) reinforces the idea 
that the team captain has both legitimate and coercive 
power, and (3) deprives the former team member of the 
inferior level of legitimate power he possessed.22 This 
operates to enable the captain to delay the revelation of 
negative information, due to the personally devastating
21The author has found no study which examined 
whistleblowers' assertions and reported what percentage 
were subsequently validated.
22Szilagyi and Wallace (1990, 337) defined these and other 
types of power. "Legitimate power is derived from an 
individual's position in the structure or hierarchy of the 
organization. ... Coercive power is derived from the 
ability to punish others...."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 8
consequences to anyone else who dares to disclose the 
negative information.
Ordinarily, the captains1 purpose is served merely by 
delaying the explicit revelation of negative information, 
without the need to suppress it entirely. This gives the 
captains the opportunity to change sports bettors' (i.e., 
investors') expectations about the scores (i.e., financial 
results) to be reported in the future.23 If the team does 
significantly worse than expected, the key team members may 
be booed off the field by the bettors, but if expectations 
can be shifted downward before more bets are placed, then 
the same performance does not result in the same outcome to 
the key team members.24 As a result, after a shift in
23King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990, 12 0) stated, "Empirical 
research has not produced a consensus on why managers 
release forecasts...." They mentioned the signaling view, 
the role of disclosure in mitigating agency issues, and 
Ajinkya and Gift's expectations adjustment hypothesis.
(Ibid., 121) If managers have a reason for wanting the 
market to think like the managers, or if managers simply 
want "official news" to be old hat (rather than a shocking 
revelation) by the time it is announced, then there is 
theoretical support for the expectations adjustment 
hypothesis. This study assumes that managers engage in 
actions which lead the market to adjust its expectations, 
and that dismissing an incumbent auditor can be a ploy to 
allow time to manipulate expectations.
24Ruland, Tung and George (1990, 712), in a study of 
managers' forecasts, stated, "The disclosure of positive 
information may also satisfy personal objectives such as 
job retention." They did not report any consideration of 
the possibility that the disclosure of negative information 
may serve the same purpose.
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expectations, different bets have been made (i.e., 
portfolios have been adjusted) , and the key team members 
can continue to play without being booed because the 
bettors can now win those different bets. As far as bets 
are concerned, anyone attending a sporting event is likely 
to observe that winning bettors cheer more loudly than 
losing bettors.
E.7 Strengths and Limitations
The use of verbal protocols as a form of tracing of 
the decision process is well established in psychology 
research; indeed, verbal protocols constitute "the most 
common and historically important process-tracing 
method...." (Carroll and Johnson 1990, 74) The researcher 
asks the subj ect to report aloud the subj ect's thinking and 
decision process. Often, the subject will use an analogy 
to make the description more easily understandable. 
Sometimes the analogy is suggested by the researcher, and 
sometimes the analogy is self-selected by the subject. It 
is intuitively appealing to believe that a self-selected 
analogy is more likely to reflect the underlying decision 
process than an analogy suggested by the researcher, 
particularly if the analogy is self-selected by many 
subjects separated both geographically and temporally.
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However, there are potential limitations inherent in 
the use of this formulation. First, no individual subject 
self-reported the complete analogy. It may therefore be 
inaccurate. Second, seme other unreported analogy may be a 
better representation of the decision processes of 
managers.
E. 8 Summary
This appendix has observed that people who run large 
companies have themselves used sports analogies to describe 
how they manage their companies. By creating a playground 
model of the economy, it has become obvious that at least 
some managers have incentives to delay disclosing negative 
information, ancd have punished employees who have disclosed 
negative information. While external auditors are not 
employees, managers often do control the selection and 
retention of external auditors. Managers may wish to 
punish not only employees, but also non-employees who 
disclose negative information. This was the original 
motivation for this study of auditor switching.
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APPENDIX F 
THE IRRELEVANCE OF AUDITOR DISMISSAL  
VERSUS AUDITOR RESIGNATION
Auditor switching, as a strategy to delay the
disclosure of negative information, is not possible if
managers do not control the selection of auditors. Knapp
(1991, 41, Table 1) reported that managers do control the
selection of auditors, either by selecting them outright or
by giving the board of directors a list from which the
board is permitted to select. Kluger and Shields (1991,
270) confirmed this when they stated that
the CPA is effectively selected and compensated by top 
management.... The CPA serves as an advocate in tax 
and management consulting matters, but is expected to 
remain independent when conducting the audit.
Finally, there is considerable career pressure on the 
individual professional within the CPA firm to 
maintain good relationships with important clients.
If management perceives that the auditors are getting
too close to discovering what management wishes left alone,
management can decide to have a fee dispute with the
incumbent auditors, and change to a new audit firm. Since
new auditors lowball their fees (DeAngelo 1981a, 114),
observers see the lower fee charged by the new auditor and
are apt to believe the dispute really was about fees, and
only about fees. That is, the fact that the dismissal of
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the incumbent auditor was a ploy to delay the disclosure of 
negative information is never publicly disclosed.
In contrast, in some instances the incumbent auditor 
may wish to cease performing an audit for a particular 
client. For example, if the auditor perceives that 
negative information exists with respect to a client, but 
the auditors have not found and documented exactly what it 
is, the auditors can assess their business risk related to 
that client as high. Then the incumbent auditor may simply 
raise the fee quote so high that management will decide to 
engage another audit firm. Similar to the auditor 
dismissal scenario previously noted, the true reason for 
the auditor's resignation from the audit engagement is 
never brought to public attention since the observers, 
again, see the lower fee charged by the new auditor and are 
apt to believe the dispute really was about fees, and only 
about fees.
Since, in either scenario, an auditor switch occurs, 
and management is provided with an opportunity to delay 
disclosing negative information, distinguishing between 
auditor dismissal and auditor resignation is not crucial to 
this study. This is especially true given the fact that 
the incumbent auditor cannot leak negative information not 
yet known. Even if the former audit firm becomes aware of
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the negative information after the auditor switch occurs, 
the former audit firm would look like a poor loser if that 
firm has a role in the public disclosure of that negative 
information after losing the client. Therefore, even 
though this study assumes that management is the party 
attempting to delay the reporting of the negative 
information, when negative information exists, the auditor 
switch might be initiated by either management or the 
incumbent audit firm.
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